Dependence, Deception and Dispute : A Study of the Distinct Relationships between the United States’ Government and the Emerging Corporate Entities of the Second Industrial Revolution, 1865-1895 by Moore, Joseph William
Trinity University
Digital Commons @ Trinity
History Honors Theses History Department
4-22-2013
Dependence, Deception and Dispute : A Study of
the Distinct Relationships between the United
States’ Government and the Emerging Corporate
Entities of the Second Industrial Revolution,
1865-1895
Joseph William Moore
Trinity University, jmoore1@trinity.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/hist_honors
This Thesis open access is brought to you for free and open access by the History Department at Digital Commons @ Trinity. It has been accepted for
inclusion in History Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Trinity. For more information, please contact
jcostanz@trinity.edu.
Recommended Citation
Moore, Joseph William, "Dependence, Deception and Dispute : A Study of the Distinct Relationships between the United States’
Government and the Emerging Corporate Entities of the Second Industrial Revolution, 1865-1895" (2013). History Honors Theses. 5.
http://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/hist_honors/5
 
 
Dependence, Deception and Dispute 
A Study of the Distinct Relationships between the United States’ 
Government and the Emerging Corporate Entities of the 
Second Industrial Revolution, 1865-1895 
  
Joseph William Moore 
 
A departmental senior thesis submitted to the Department of History at 
Trinity University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation 
with departmental honors. 
 
April 22nd, 2013 
 _________________________ _________________________ 
 Thesis Advisor Department Chair 
 
_________________________ 
Associate Vice President 
for 
Academic Affairs 
 
 
Student Copyright Declaration: the author has selected the following copyright provision (select only one): 
  
[ ] This thesis is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which allows some 
noncommercial copying and distribution of the thesis, given proper attribution.  To view a copy of this license, visit 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 559 Nathan Abbott Way, Stanford, California 94305, 
USA. 
  
[ ] This thesis is protected under the provisions of U.S. Code Title 17.  Any copying of this work other than “fair use” (17 USC 107) is 
prohibited without the copyright holder’s permission. 
  
[ ] Other: 
 
Distribution options for digital thesis: 
  
[  ] Open Access (full-text discoverable via search engines) 
 
[  ] Restricted to campus viewing only (allow access only on the Trinity University campus via digitalcommons.trinity.edu) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependence, Deception and Dispute 
A Study of the Distinct Relationships between the United States’ 
Government and the Emerging Corporate Entities of the 
Second Industrial Revolution, 1865-1895 
 
 
 
By 
Joseph William Moore 
 
Dr. Latimore 
Department of History  
Trinity University  
April 22nd 2013 
 
 
 
 
Moore 1 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................2 
Background on Key Industries .....................................................................................................5 
The Railroad Industry ...................................................................................................................5 
The Financial Industry ...............................................................................................................12 
The Petroleum Industry ..............................................................................................................23 
Union Pacific Corporation ..........................................................................................................28 
The Creation of the Union Pacific Railroad Company ..............................................................28 
Additional Governmental Subsidies ...........................................................................................30 
Completion & Growth Period ....................................................................................................33 
Crédit Mobilier of America Scandal ..........................................................................................36 
Government Oversight & the Interstate Commerce Act ............................................................39 
Concluding Remarks ..................................................................................................................40 
JP Morgan & Company. .............................................................................................................41 
Junius Morgan and the first incarnations of JP Morgan & Company ........................................41 
The Morgans’ relationship with European Investors  ................................................................46 
JP Morgan and Railroads  ..........................................................................................................48 
JP Morgan the Investment Banker .............................................................................................54 
The Panic of 1893 & The Infamous Deal of 1895 .....................................................................55 
Concluding Remarking ..............................................................................................................61 
Standard Oil Company ...............................................................................................................63 
Standard Oil’s Origins ................................................................................................................63 
Standard Oil Company of Ohio and then of New Jersey ...........................................................70 
Acquisitions and Mergers ...........................................................................................................74 
Transportation Advantage ..........................................................................................................78 
Rockefeller’s Philosophy of Business and Government ............................................................79 
Government Policy on Oil ..........................................................................................................82 
Concluding Remarks ..................................................................................................................84 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................85 
References .....................................................................................................................................88 
Primary Sources .........................................................................................................................88 
Secondary Sources .....................................................................................................................89 
 
 
 
Moore 2 
 
Introduction 
The victory of the Union in the Civil War was not only an answer to the question of 
slavery and states’ rights, but to the question of whose economic system was superior. The 
Union’s triumph meant more than just the reunification of the United States, but also the success 
of the northern economy of urbanization, immigration, industrial capitalism and wage labor in 
contrast to the agrarian southern economy. The north prospered as a second wave of 
industrialization took effect and the south stagnated for decades as it tried to cling to its old 
economic system.1 The Civil War transformed the role of the federal government in the affairs of 
the economy and the budding corporate community. Before the war, the federal government had 
only 20,000 employees and made few attempts to regulate business.  
Instead, the government was seen as a promoter and protector of American interests, not 
a regulator. A fragmented political caught between the battles of states’ rights versus a powerful 
government paralyzed any attempts of the government to significantly intervene or aid in the 
development of American economic goals. Even after the victory of the Republicans and the 
Union, which meant a more pro-active federal government, the movement for increased 
regulation was weak. The result was a federal government willing to aid financially to a 
developing business community, but without any serious regulation. The opportunity gave the 
new businesses of the 19th century an opportunity to flourish.2 
The time period of the Second Industrial Revolution, also known as the Gilded Age, 1865 
– 1895, witnessed the dramatic evolution of these businesses from simple partnerships or crude 
firms into complex corporations and companies. However, success was not a guaranteed and 
                                                 
1 Ron Chernow, Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. New York: Random House Digital, Inc, 1998, pg 98. 
2 Chernow, Titan, pg 99. Several of Chernow’s books are cited in this analysis and the short hand of the title will be 
used to delineate his different works.  
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especially during the panic of 1873 and 1893, numerous businesses failed. So how did a business 
successfully grow into a major corporate entity during this era? The focus of this analysis is on 
that question.  
The companies that will be examined are Union Pacific Corporation, JP Morgan 
Company and Standard Oil Company. Each company represents a distinct industry that 
flourished during the second industrial age and exerted influence on the US economy. This thesis 
will measure the success and viability of a company as determined by how autonomous its 
operations were of outside forces, both the government and other firms, while maintaining a 
healthy relationship with the US government. These two goals became increasingly more 
important during the Second Industrial Age as the US government became more actively 
involved in the economy through increased regulation and observation of the business 
community. The interactions and relationships these companies experienced with the US 
government during the Gilded Age developed in tangent with the major expansion of 
government as an overseer of the private sector. Each company occupied a different role and 
held a different philosophy on the role of government in their industries during the 
unprecedented economic growth of the second industrial revolution. The reactions of these three 
companies further highlighted the evolution of the business community’s engagement with, 
philosophy of, and acceptance of a more proactive and engaged government.  
The reactions of these three firms to United States’ decision-making led each company 
on a different route through the Gilded Age and had very significant impacts on future 
developments to their business operations. Union Pacific was dependent on the aid and support 
of the US government for continual economic growth through the Gilded Age and pursued a 
relationship, in which it relied upon government for sustained business operations. US Standard 
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Oil, in contrast, held an autonomous stance toward government intervention and aid, which 
eventually developed into an antagonistic relationship. JP Morgan chose to act as a facilitator of 
credit and funds to the developing US economy and therefore aided the US government in this 
capacity. Each company experienced a different relationship and their successes and failures 
highlight what qualities ensured the survival of the company during the second industrial 
revolution. Therefore, the central argument of this thesis is that each company reacted in a 
different manner to the growing federal government and therefore experienced a different 
relationship. The result of these relationships yielded a different outcome for the firm’s success 
at the end of  the second industrial revolution. 
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Background on Key Industries  
 Understanding the complex relationship between the US government and these three 
companies requires a comprehensive background of their industries during the Antebellum 
period. Each industry background will focus on key details related to the respective companies 
and therefore will not be able to cover all of the complexes of these industries. The railroad 
industry background is focused on the development of the transcontinental railroad, which was 
the purpose for Union Pacific’s creation. The financial background will focus on banking and on 
the US credit market, which was vital to the development of JP Morgan & Company. The 
Petroleum Industry background will focus explicitly on the development of oil refining, which 
was the focus of Standard Oil’s business operations.  
The Railroad Industry 
The demand for a transcontinental railroad started at a grassroots level in the mid-19th 
century. In an effort to incentivize railroad growth through private industry, the US government 
provided substantial grants of land to developing railroad companies in the 1860’s. The goal of 
the US government was to reduce a part of the barrier of entry many railroad companies 
experienced in the form of land costs.  Furthermore, the creation of a transcontinental railroad 
was also intended to join various minor railways across the Western United States to maintain 
effective transportation of goods and products.  
An early expression of this demand was in an article in the Emigrant, a weekly 
newspaper out of Michigan, on February 6th, 1832 by an unknown author. The writer expressed 
hope for grand transportation scheme, whether by railway or not, to unite the east and west. He 
elaborated his proposal by claiming that “we hope the United States will not object to conducting 
this national project… But if the United States would not do this… Congress would not, we 
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presume, object to the organization of a company and a grant of three millions of acres for this 
purpose.”3  
Soon, the idea began to pick up in public discourse, Samuel Bancroft Barlow in the 
Intelligencer, a local Granville, Massachusetts’ newspaper, proposed that the railroad could be 
“accomplished by our general government at the expense of the Union.”4  Barlow then went into 
detail about a potential method of raising revenue for the project and its implementation. In 
1835, Rev. Samuel Parker, a missionary from a Presbyterian church in Ithaca, New York, who 
was sent to Oregon to convert Indians, wrote in his journal about the idea of constructing a 
railroad after his journey over the Rocky Mountains. He claimed that: 
“There would be no difficulty in the way of constructing a railroad from the Atlantic to 
the Pacific Ocean, there is no greater difficulty in the whole distance than has already 
been overcome in passing the Green Mountains between Boston and Albany; and 
probably the time may not be far distant when tours will be made across the continent, as 
they have been made to Niagara Falls to see Nature’s wonders.”5 
 
As the idea became a larger part of public discourse, particular individuals took upon 
themselves to advocate and develop a plan for implementation of a railway. John Plumbe, of 
Dubuque, Iowa, in 1836 advocated the development of a railway from Lake Michigan to Oregon 
and in March 1838 brought together a meeting for the consideration of his idea. Then in 1840, 
Plumbe allegedly visited Washington with a proposal from the Wisconsin Legislature requesting 
an appropriation of alternate sections of public land on each side a proposed railway. However, 
this proposal was allegedly defeated by the Southern Representatives.6    
The first proposals to create a transcontinental railroad initiated a major debate over the 
role of government in the US economy. The debate focused on whether government or private 
                                                 
3 Athearn, Robert G, Union Pacific Country, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971, pg 14. 
4 Ibid, pg 14. 
5 Davis, John P, The Union Pacific Railway, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 8 
(1896): pg 16. 
6 Ibid, pg 18. 
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enterprise should develop a railway for the nation. It specifically centered on the constitutional 
power of the federal government to build the railway or to grant funds for the construction and 
development by a private company. Strict constructionists held that the federal government held 
a very limited, if no rule whatsoever, in aiding the construction and that instead that the states, 
the territories or private capitalists should by their own initiative develop the railway for the 
nation.7 
Scholar John P. Davis notes that by 1838, the concept of a railway connecting the rail 
systems of the East to the Pacific had ceased to be novel, but was freely suggested, predicted, 
and urged in the newspapers, journals and magazines of the time. However, the major advocate 
for a transcontinental railroad was Asa Whitney, a merchant in New York City, whose mission 
and goal was the construction of a railway from Lake Michigan or the Mississippi River to the 
Pacific Ocean.8 Whitney first brought his dream to Congress in January 28, 1845, in a 
presentation to the Senate, through the aid of Senator Dickinson, and to the House of 
Representatives, through the aid of Representative Pratt. Whitney’s plan was to build a railway 
from Lake Michigan to the mouth of the Columbia River in Oregon, though he modified the 
plan9 so that it should begin at Prairie du Chien and end at Puget’s Sound and considered further 
modifications when California joined the Union.  
Whitney presented a second proposal to Congress in 1846, citing his experience on the 
Liverpool and Manchester Railroad in England in 1830. Whitney claimed that in seeing the 
relative speed and the efficient nature with which the English railway was constructed, he 
foresaw a great future for railways in the United States in facilitating trade.10 However, the 
                                                 
7 Ibid, pg 47. 
8 Ibid, pg 16-19.  
9 He modified the plan when Wisconsin became a state 
10 Ibid, 19. 
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proposal and resulting legislation was dismissed with no real action outside of committee 
meetings and then Congress adjourned without considering Whitney’s scheme. Yet, Whitney did 
not give up and instead choose to begin a systematic bombardment of Congress directly and 
indirectly through every available means that could affect public opinion.11 In fact, every 
subsequent meeting of Congress for the next several years yielded Whitney’s scheme and 
Whitney went from city to city across the nations holding public meeting about his proposal. 
However, his presentations were not always well received, on January 4, 1847, Whitney 
addressed a large crowd in a hall in Tabernacle, New York, when a mob briefly took control of 
the hall and denounced the project as a swindle of the federal government. The railroad scholar 
John P. Davis claims that after Whitney’s presentation tour, mature public opinion finally passed 
judgment on the project and rejected it.12    
Whitney had a third proposal introduced to Congress in 1848, but the Senate voted 
against considering a bill for this proposal. Whitney elaborated on his dream in a pamphlet he 
published in 1849, in which he states: 
“My desire and object have been to carry out and accomplish this great work for the 
motives, as here and everywhere else by me declared, to give my country this great 
thoroughfare for all nations without the cost of a dollar; to give employment to and make 
comfortable and happy millions who are now destitute and starving, and to bring all the 
world together in free intercourse as one nation.”13    
 
Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri became the staunch advocate for westward 
expansion in 1850’s and the representative for the advocates of a national railway. However, he 
endorsed the idea that private enterprise should develop this national railway because he felt the 
opportunity was so great that “capital seeking investment would find this particular temptation 
                                                 
11 Ibid, 24. 
12 Ibid, 28. 
13 Ibid, 19-20. 
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irresistible.”14 He claimed that the lands beyond the Missouri River possessed a vast amount of 
natural resources and wealth that a national and a unified railway could provide access to and 
develop a civilization around its tracks. He felt that the line was necessary for the: 
“Emigrants of America would flock upon it as pigeons to their roosts, tear open the 
bosom of the virgin soil, and spring into existence of the long line of farms and houses, of 
towns and villages … and all that civilization affords … to give protection and 
employment to the road, and to balance the populous communities in the eastern half of 
the Union by equal populations on its western half.”15  
 
A bill was salvaged out of Whitney’s proposal and presented to the 32nd Congress on 
April on April 1, 1852, which permitted the sale of public lands to Whitney to build the railroad, 
however the bill was defeated due to growing sectionalism in the United States.16 The 
sectionalism held two major dimensions in this context; the first dimension was a political battle 
between the Northern and Southern states over where the railroad was to be established and 
battles between different cities over the trail of the railroad.17 However, other concerns with 
Whitney’s proposal focused on Whitney himself and his qualifications to pursue such a grand 
project. The American Railroad Journal on April 5, 1851 claimed that:  
“We freely admit that Mr. Whitney possesses some qualities which eminently fit him to 
head a great enterprise… But here his qualifications for conducting to a successful issue a 
work of such magnitude as that of a railroad from the Atlantic to the Pacific end. He is 
self-confident without experience or training, arrogant in his opinions, and overbearing 
toward all who differ from him. He has a hearty contempt for the whole engineering 
profession and loses his temper the moment one of that class talks about tunneling, 
bridging, excavation, etc., which are certainly great annoyances in railroad construction 
and which have made others beside Mr. Whitney lose their temper… We are sorry for his 
disappointments and heartily wish he would adapt his scheme to the practical ideas of the 
present day of which he appears to have not the least appreciation.”18 
 
                                                 
14 Athearn, 22-23. 
15 Ibid, 22-23. 
16 Galloway, John Debo, The First Transcontinental Railroad, New York: Simmons-Boardman, 1950, pg 34. 
17 Davis, 37. 
18 Galloway, 34-35. 
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The journalist community took on the idea as well as seen in Horace Greeley’s book An 
Overland Journey, in which Greeley argues for the implementation of a national railroad. 
Greeley’s argument highlights key ideas and potential facts about the economic potential 
surrounding a national railroad. He estimates that an average of 50 million dollars’ worth of gold 
from San Francisco19 and that the government spends an average of 6 million dollars on 
transportation of its men, munitions and materials to the West Coast.20 Overall, Greeley’s text 
highlights the unlimited potential for cost savings and additional revenues or resources a national 
railroad could yield and the public perception of this idea.21  
However, key elements of the political community remained skeptical of the ability of 
private enterprise to fund the development of the railroad. In particular, John W. Dawson, 
Governor of the Utah Territory of 1861, who made the crossing in the early 1860’s, told the 
legislative assembly of Utah, that as necessary as the railroad was to the nation, he was skeptical 
of its creation through private capital. He claimed that “the intervening country was such that 
private capital could not undertake the work… to this staunch Unionist the railroad was a 
national undertaking, and ‘it is right that it should be made by the nation.’”22 Representative 
Justin Morrill, of Vermont and Representative James Campbell, of Pennsylvania held a similar 
view and that the desert and plains posed a challenge too great for even the most bold of 
investors and claimed that no capitalist would invest a single dollar in a project that ran any 
                                                 
19 Horace Greeley, “An Overland Journey from New York to San Francisco in the Summer of 1859,” Yosemite 
Online, last modified 2005, http://www.yosemite.ca.us/library/greeley/greeley.pdf.  
20 Ibid, 127. 
21 Greeley on page 127 highlights how “the Federal government is now paying some twenty-five millions per annum 
for military service, mainly west of the Mississippi. Nearly half of this heavy sum is paid for transportation in its 
various shapes—for the conveyance of provisions, munitions, etc., to the army in Utah, and to the various posts 
scattered through the Indian country; for horses, mules, and wagons, required to facilitate the conveyance of 
soldiers, arms, munitions, and baggage from post to post, etc., etc. Every regiment employed in the Indian country, 
or on the Pacific, costs the treasury at least one thousand dollars per man per annum, of which I estimate that nearly 
half would be saved by a Pacific railroad. Certainly, the saving from this source could not fall short of five millions 
per annum.” 
22 Athearn, 26. 
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distance across the plains. Congressmen Morrill feared that any bill with only land grants and no 
financial subsidies opened the flood gate for speculators to abuse the system. 23 Eventually, the 
concept that private enterprise or private investment would not, in the foreseeable future, be 
attracted to invest significantly in the West on projects such as the railroad, was ingrained in 
Congressional minds. 
Right up to the onset of the Civil War, the major proponents for the construction of the 
national railroad with government cooperation or assistance, argued on the grounds of public 
necessity. William Seward, then US Senator of New York, promoted this logic and claimed “that 
a railroad is necessary, and ought to be built; and I think it has been scientifically demonstrated 
… that not only one such road is feasible, but that at least three, four, or five routes offer the 
necessary facilities for the security of this great object.”24 The result of these different sets of 
arguments was the ultimate conclusion by many legislators that government aid was a 
presupposed condition for the construction of the national railroad. Furthermore, the alleged 
harshness and desolate nature of parts of the plains encourage Senators that the Congress in 
providing land grants was giving away nothing for some “miserable acres.”25 The Civil War 
exacerbated the need for the railroad and gave the necessary political momentum for the creation 
and implementation of a transcontinental railroad.  
Proponents for federal government involvement argued for the need of enhanced 
communication between the eastern and western United States and the federal government could 
expedite the process. Furthermore, the debate focused on whether the United States might need 
to transport an army to any disputed territory more quickly than current methods over water.26 
                                                 
23 Ibid, 26. 
24 Ibid, 27-28. 
25 Athearn, 28. 
26 Davis, 47.  
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The intensive interactions with different tribes of western Native Americans further intensified 
the problem and proponents argued that unified railways allowed for more efficient deployment 
of troops across the plains.  The Mormon Rebellion of 1857-1858 reinforced the argument for a 
military need for an expedient development of a national railway. The acquisition of California 
from Mexico in 1848, which introduce a vast amount of territory and by the 1850’s, a large 
population and an increased demand for a railway to the East and the increased communication 
associated with the railroad with the East.27 Eventually, the intrusion of the Civil War brought 
the danger of national disruption and Congress was left with any doubt of the public necessity of 
a unified national railway, which required federal government assistance.28 
The constitutional power of Congress to create a corporation for building a railway was 
doubted. But the Civil War had its effect on this question and the increased activity of the federal 
government during the war necessitated a unified means of transportation. Furthermore, the 
removal from Congress of its state rights and strict construction members, made many things 
possible, such as the incorporation of the Union Pacific Railroad Company.29 Eventually, the 
construction of national railroad found its way to the platform of the 1860 Republican Party 
Convention and the Baltimore platform of the Democratic Party that had withdrawn from the 
Charleston convention.30  
Financial Industry 
In 1811 the charter of the First Bank of the United States expired and Congress refused to 
renew it due constitutional concerns. The result of this decision was that the United States was 
without a central banking institution. The immediate consequence of the expiration of the First 
                                                 
27 Telegraph lines built with railroad 
28 Davis, 48. 
29 Ibid, 49. 
30 Ibid, 96 
Moore 13 
 
Bank was financial confusion as the young financial system of the United States had to learn to 
deal with the newly formed power vacuum with the departure of the First Bank. However, the 
interregnum between the tenure of the First Bank of the United States and the Second Bank was 
brief and largely due to the financial difficulties created by the War of 1812.  
The War of 1812 left the young United States with a blooming debt that by late 1814 had 
grown from $45 million to $100 million.31 Congress was inclined to accept a government-
sponsored bank as a means of absorbing present and future debt. A bank bill went to President 
James Madison in 1815 that proposed the capitalization of the Bank of the United States for $30 
million.32 However, Madison vetoed the bill because he felt that government bonds held by the 
Bank were about to realize an appreciation, thus shouldering the government with a capital loss. 
A new bank bill was written and being reconsidered in Congress, which met Madison's 
objections. On the other hand, Alexander James Dallas, then Secretary of the Treasury, argued 
for the recreation of a national bank that issued notes and should take the place of the Treasury 
notes. Dallas felt that state bank issues had to be curtailed in order for resumption of specie 
payments, which had been suspended during the war, to be considered genuine and since the 
outstanding Treasury notes were being retired during the next year and therefore not suffice as a 
national currency.33  
A primary problem of the economic situation of the time was that the country was left 
without any common medium of exchange because there was no central bank. Therefore, the 
government was forced to receive its revenues in state-bank paper and treasury notes. The 
                                                 
31 Richard H. Timberlake Jr., The Origins of Central Banking in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1976), pg 325-326.  
32 Ibid, 326. The act specified that $5 million was to be in specie, $10 million in specie or the public debt authorized 
by Congress in March of 1812, and $15 million in specie or the Treasury notes authorized in June of 1812, or those 
which would be issued by any subsequent acts of Congress. 
33 Ibid, 326 
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national bank would soak them up as capital and maybe "issue notes of a similar character, for a 
limited time, but then allow the Treasury notes to be refinanced as long- term debt until such 
debt could ultimately be redeemed.”34 Dallas argued for a national bank that would solve all 
problems at no cost. He also saw the bank responsible to Congress, but also independent" of 
Congress while in active competition with state banks. Dallas claimed that:  
“The National Bank ought not to be regarded simply as a commercial bank. . . . It will 
operate... upon the funds of the nation. .. . In fine, it is not an institution created for the 
purposes of commerce and profit alone, but much more for the purposes of national 
policy, as an auxiliary in the exercise of some of the highest powers of the 
Government.”35 
 
Treasury notes, otherwise known as paper money, had been printed to finance the War of  
1812 and were used as bank reserves. The result was an increase in the stock of money and 
forced the market price of specie beyond the reach of the mint price. In December 1815, 
Secretary Dallas stated in response that “it is essential that the quantity of bank paper in 
circulation should be reduced.” Dallas argued that a national bank helped in this process because 
“it would not have to resume, only commence, and it would have the advantage of the public 
deposits in coin to help it do the job.”36 
The next Secretary of the Treasury, William Crawford, who took office in 1816 also 
actively promoted banking policy. After he assumed the office, he stated that the government 
shall take upon itself the principal burden of restoring the circulating medium to specie value by 
withholding “from circulation as much of their [banks'] paper now in the Treasury . . . as the 
demands upon the Treasury during the ensuing year will permit.”37 In February of 1817, after 
extensive debate, negotiation and numerous amendments, a bill passed through Congress and 
                                                 
34 Timberlake Jr., 326. 
35 Ibid, 327. It would be re-quoted in 1834 by the Whigs in their efforts to keep the Second Bank alive.  
36 Ibid, 329. 
37 Ibid, 329. 
Moore 15 
 
was signed by James Madison. The Second Bank of the United States was established as a 
private corporation with public duties. The Bank was in charge of all fiscal transactions for the 
US Government and was accountable to Congress and the US Treasury department. Twenty 
percent of its capital was owned by the United States’ federal government, which was the Bank's 
single largest stockholder. Thousands of private investors held 80% of the Bank's capital, which 
a significant portion including foreign persons. 
The Bank’s power stemmed from its depository relationship with the government and 
other banks, which provided control over the extension of credit by banks throughout the US 
financial system. The government's receipts arose principally from taxes and tariffs, which came 
in the form bank notes. These bank notes usually originated from private banks, which provided 
the bulk of the money in circulation and the Bank received these notes on deposit from the 
government. Therefore, the Bank became the creditor of the private banks that issued them and 
presented them for payment.38 The Bank strictly observed and enforced its credit standards upon 
the private banks with the effect of restricting lending and private issuance of notes. In essence, 
the Bank’s regulatory powers were contingent on a private bank falling into debt to it.39 
During the postwar boom of 1817-1818, the Bank functioned in a similar fashion as any 
other bank with several unique aspects. It acted as a lender of last resort and it did not restrain the 
private banks by forcing them to redeem their notes.40 However, the public perception of the 
Bank was strained and public officials became increasingly critical of its financial operations. 
The Bank still faced challenges concerning its constitutional and operations; however the US 
Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Bank in 1819 case McCulloch v. Maryland. 
                                                 
38 Bray Hammond, “Jackson, Biddle, and the Bank of the United States,” Journal of Economic History, VIII (May 
1947), 2. 
39 Ibid, 2. 
40 Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957), pg 328. 
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In 1820, Crawford made an address to the House of Representatives, in which he 
attempted to absolve the Second Bank of the evils ascribed to it in transferring the currency for 
the government. The Bank, he wrote "was only a passive agent in the hands of the 
Government."41 The Bank continued in this role for the next few years until, in 1823, Nicholas 
Biddle was made President of the Second Bank. In 1829, the Bank encountered a major political 
threat, the newly elected President of the United States, Andrew Jackson. Jackson had been 
skeptical of not only the national bank, but all paper money banks and was considered a “hard 
money” man.42 Furthermore, he considered the Second United States Bank as a monopoly with a 
corrupting influence upon the nation.  
“The restoration of the gold currency was effected under Gen. Jackson’s administration; 
the establishment of the hard money currency for the federal government, and the 
keeping of its own money in its own treasuries, was accomplished under Mr. Van Buren, 
both of which Presidents took the full responsibility of recommending these three 
measures, and also the two others—the two for the imposition of a stamp duty on all 
paper money‘ under twenty dollars, and for a bankrupt act against defaulting banks. Bills 
were repeatedly brought into Congress for both purposes, but were always (defeated by 
the defection of the paper money wing of the democratic party.”43 
 
Jackson’s actions highlighted a growing philosophical divide in the United States over 
banking into several groups of thoughts, pro-banking, anti-banking and no-banking. The anti-
banking idea, as the scholar Leonard Helderman claims, was rooted in a general fear that large 
corporations were in some way obstructionist to the idea of American individualism.44 In 1835 
Governor Mason of Michigan vetoed a steamboat charter because he felt that “acts of 
                                                 
41 Timberlake Jr., 330. 
42 Leonard Clinton Helderman, National and State banks: A Study Of Their Origins, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 
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incorporation are aristocratic in their tendencies.” 45 A New York Assembly committee reported 
it was “a palpable fraud for bankers to pretend that they are democrats, or that any man is a 
democrat who contends for bank paper.”46  
In his first annual address, Jackson stated that  
 
"both the constitutionality and the expediency of the law creating the bank were well 
questioned by a large portion of our fellow-citizens, and it must be admitted by all that it 
has failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency.”47 
On July 10, 1832, President Andrew Jackson vetoed a bill that sought to renew the 
corporate charter of the Second Bank of the United States. 48 The Senate voted on overturning his 
veto, but failed, the attempted had been largely fueled by the National Republicans. Jackson, also 
fearful of the connection between the bank and the national republicans, openly questioned 
whether the bank was still a safe depository of the people’s money.49 The Democratic-controlled 
House of Representatives eventually rejected a bill from pro-Jackson forces that proposed to sell 
the government’s shares in the bank.  
Jackson then moved by issuing an executive order, which mandated the removal of all 
federal deposits in the bank. In 1833, federal revenue was diverted into selected private banks, 
which ended the regulatory role of the Second Bank of the United States. The Bank expired on 
March 3, 1836 because of its charter and the will of President Andrew Jackson. The Bank 
therefore became a private corporation and was eventually liquidated in 1841.50 However, the 
expiration of the Second Bank had a major impact upon the financial system and the general 
economy of the United States. The panic of 1837 was devastating on the American banking 
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system and led to two growing domestic movements, a reform crusade and anti-bank reaction. 
The anti-bank reaction solidified around a hard money movement in the West and to abolish 
banks.51 The hard money idea was rooted, at the time, in economic theory rather than simple 
belief and had long before the panic of 1837 and existed long throughout the economic history of 
the United States.52 The economy did not fully recover until 1843.  
An underlying political trend associated the development of national banking in the 
United States was highlighted by two factions. The first faction, who were the champions of 
banking development in the United States were the Federalists, Whigs, Republicans, 
conservatives, strongly focused on the need for banking. The other faction consisted of the “anti-
Bullionist” populists, Southern Democrats and the banking schools of monetary thought.53 
During Jackson’s tenure as President, hard money economic belief was a central tenet of the left 
wing of the Democratic party. In the minds of the Democratic politicians, hard money resonated 
with an ideal of America that “was still a land of refuge and freedom rather than a place to make 
money.”54 These two factions varied in their belief in the role of government as an overseer of 
the US financial network. Republicans advocated an approach through the private sector, such as 
the previous US national banks, whereas the Democrats advocated for a public banking 
institution.  
The next major development occurred in the last 1850’s with the panic of 1857. In the 
early 1850s, the United States experienced an economic boom, but in 1857, the European market 
for American goods declined. The decline in European consumption of American goods scared 
the financial community and eastern banks became cautious with their loans to the west because 
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the goods from the west experienced the biggest drop in consumption.55 However, the market 
finally entered a panic when Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company failed on August 24th.56 
The impact of the panic was so great that even by President Lincoln’s accession to office, 
federal finances had not recovered. The lack of funds presented a problem to President Lincoln 
as the Civil War broke out with the beginning of hostilities at Fort Sumner in April 1861. A war 
was going to cost a lot of money and so Congress reacted with the Act of July 17, 1861. The act 
allowed for $250,000,000 to be borrowed on the credit of the United States. $50,000,000 was 
authorized as non-interest bearing Treasury Notes, payable upon demand, in denominations less 
than $50 dollars and not less than $10 dollars. The notes were called Demand Notes to 
distinguish them from the interest-bearing Treasury Notes in existence at the time. The promise 
to pay specie "on demand" was a new obligation for Treasury Notes, although a common 
practice seen with private bank notes. The important fact here was that the federal government 
issuing a currency like financial note. Eventually, these notes functioned as a means of 
accounting for firms, rather than hard currency. The federal government was now issuing a paper 
currency as a means of raising funds. Over the coming years, the government’s need for 
additional funds through bonds or notes brought about the American financial system.    
Following the civil war, the financial industry in the US experienced not only significant 
growth, but a major change in business practice over the course of the Second Industrial 
Revolution. A result of these changes was the development of the investment banking sub-
industry. The new banking sub-industry reinforced and pushed forward the growth of the second 
industrial revolution by reducing barriers to entry to the equity markets for developing 
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companies. Traditionally, banks had operated as a source of loans for budding companies, but 
the new investment banks focused on facilitating the distribution or investment in the Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) of companies. In the beginning, these banks functioned as the middlemen 
for financing options for the US companies and different levels of government to available 
sources of funds. The funds originated in Europe for most of the second industrial revolution 
until the shift of the financial world to New York City in the twentieth century. However, the 
development of a more professionalized and skill financing sector within the United States had 
the effect of reducing the cost of capital and other financing options for US companies. The 
significance of this action cannot be understated. The fragmented nature of the US banking 
system and credit markets caused a high cost of capital for US companies. The effective result 
was the growth was diminished because companies could not use debt or equity to further grow 
their business operations. 
In a general sense, the US credit market as developed through the American banking and 
securities market was fragmented and disjointed after the end of the Civil War. As US businesses 
began to grow and the concurrent development of the US equity market created a new 
opportunity for banking and finance in the United States. The fragmented nature of America’s 
banking network had developed a dependence on foreign capital. The access to foreign capital 
was through a new banking industry, investment banking, such as JP Morgan, Kuhn, or Loeb & 
Co.. One of the major functions of these firms was to serve as the middle man for the sale of US 
government and private corporate on European markets. The effect of this relationship caused a 
complicated maze of banking relations, in which American investment banks held a large 
amount of power over the American companies dependent on foreign markets to maintain short-
term and long-term financing.  
Moore 21 
 
New York investment banks had to work through an array of specialized institutions, 
such as trust companies or syndicates of banks and private investors.57 The fragmented nature of 
American banking, along with the directorship arrangements made by banks like JP Morgan, 
gave rise to a “shadowy, dense network of cross-directorships and financial ties.”58 The extents 
of some of these financial abuses were investigated in the Congressional Pujo Committee of 
1912/13. The president of New York First National Bank, George F. Baker, once claimed that  
“four investment banks (JP Morgan; Kuhn, Loeb & Co.; Kidder, Peabody; and Lee, 
Higgenson) were involved in every securities issue that exceeded more than $10 million, 
which brought the total value of securities issued each year to well over $500 million.”59  
 Concurrent to all of these developments was a major trend during the 19th century in the 
financial industry to adhere to the Gentleman Banker’s Code. The code was an informal style 
that bankers adopted in matters concerning their lending practices. The elite banks did not try to 
scout out a business or actively seek new clients, but instead awaited their arrival for a request 
for a loan or bond purchases. The banks made informal agreements to not openly compete and 
therefore push the clients into an almost subservient role.  There was not a cartel, as the clients 
perceived, but instead a silent competition that masked the vicious relations among the banks.60  
The developing role of American investment banks during the second industrial 
revolution began to take shape under the practices of JP Morgan & Co.. In a basic sense, these 
new “investment” banks operated in a high-profile role by providing or facilitating the private 
financing options for the major corporate entities of the United States. In particular, investment 
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banks focused on infrastructural & massive public service corporations, such as railroads and 
utilities, which were perceived to be growth areas of the second industrial revolution.61 
Yet, despite these tremendous needs for capital, financial markets were provincial and 
limited in scope. The banker allocated the economy's scarce credit. His imprimatur alone 
reassured investors that unknown companies were sound—there were no government agencies to 
regulate security issues or prospectuses—and he became integral to their operation. Companies 
become associated with their bankers, such as the New York Central Railroad, which was later 
called a Morgan road. In this phase of the second industrial revolution, companies were dynamic 
but extremely unstable. In an atmosphere of feverish growth, many businesses fell into the hands 
of unscrupulous promoters, charlatans, and stock manipulators. Even visionary entrepreneurs 
often lacked the managerial skills necessary to convert their inspirations into national industries, 
and no cadre of professional managers yet existed. The bankers vouched for securities and often 
ended up running companies if they defaulted. As the Gilded Age progressed, the line between 
finance and commerce increasingly began to blur until much of industry passed under the control 
of the bankers.62 
The result was that bankers dictated terms to sovereign states, countries and major 
companies. It was said that "the mighty loan-mongers on whose fiat the fate of kings and empires 
sometimes depended."63 The bankers acquired this degree of power because countries engaged in 
war lacked the financial resources or effective tax systems to sustain. The biggest banks, through 
large scale operations involving numerous smaller banks and wealthy investors, functioned as 
their defunct treasury departments or central banks to the major governments. The Morgan’s 
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would later claim this status and effectively utilized the ideas of the Gentleman’s Banker Code as 
a means of reducing or eliminating any substantial risk for losses.64 
Furthermore, due to the fragmented nature of the banking system in the United States 
because of the lack of a central bank, the task of a unified monetary and fiscal policy was 
indirectly left to the private banking sector. JP Morgan & Co. in cooperation with other key 
investment banks functioned as a proxy central banking entity to stabilize financial crises, crises 
of faith in the value of the dollar and the soundness of the banking system.65 The role of 
investment banks a quasi-central bank ensured their survival from a governmental perspective. 
Since the bank's operations ensured the continual flow of commerce and credit through the US 
the government had to maintain the presence of these firms. 
Petroleum Industry 
The first major discovery of oil was in August of 1859 by the American oil driller, Edwin 
L. Drake, in northwestern Pennsylvania along the Alleghany River, in an area that later would be 
known as the Oil Regions. The discovery unleashed a wave of speculators upon the region and 
began an intense competition to buy or lease land in Pennsylvania to secure oil rights. The 
discovery caused an immediate boom in oil drilling throughout the nation, from Manitoulin 
Island to Alabama and from Missouri to Central New York. The petroleum product created a 
new industry and many businessmen and merchants, some locally, but mostly newcomers 
became oilmen. The rural regions of Pennsylvania were suddenly swamped with new settlers, 
mostly of an urban origin and began a gradual change from rural to urban as the oil industry 
grew. For nearly 30 years essentially all U.S. oil production came from this area. Shortly, the 
region would be covered in derricks and lead to the development oil drilling practices and 
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equipment. John D. Rockefeller, the famous oil man and refiner, years after the establishment 
and success of his business, would claim how the discovery revealed the “vast stores of wealth… 
the gifts of the great Creator.”66  
When Drake first discovered oil in Pennsylvania, the only major method of transportation 
available to transport the oil was by the wagon, operated by the Teamsters, who charged very 
high fees for transportation due to the lack of available railways. Since oil was a cheap, 
standardized commodity, transportation costs were incredibly important to the profitability and 
success in the infant industry.67 The oil industry’s solution was an extensive network of 
pipelines, which received intensive resistance from the Teamsters and in many cases physical 
confrontation. Before these networks of pipelines could be installed, the next solution was to 
utilize the expanding railway networks. The result was better and faster access across the nation 
for oil, although it supplemented the Teamster’s influence with that of the railroad companies.   
Although, the main drilling operations and activities of the oil boom were restrained to 
Pennsylvania the hysteria and belief and oil were extended throughout the nation. In 1865, then 
Congressmen James Garfield describes this phenomenon in a letter to a former staff office: 
“I have conversed on the general question of oil with a number of members who are in 
the business, for you know the fever has assailed Congress in no mild form… Oil, not 
cotton, is King now, in the world of commerce.” 68 
  
As oil became more profitable, refineries began to centralize in 6 competing centers, the 
3 inland centers and 3 seaboard centers. The inland centers were the Oil Regions, which included 
West Virginia, rural Pennsylvania and rural Ohio,69 Pittsburgh and Cleveland. The seaboard 
centers were New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore. Soon, the oil boom became a popular topic 
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among writers as a sign of a new economic era, it was proclaimed as “The Wonder of the 19th 
Century.”70 The oil boom in Pennsylvania was compared to the gold rush to California and this 
became the image of quick wealth and treasure to the American people.71 The oil industry was 
seen to be transforming the agrarian economy of Pennsylvania into a more industrialized one. B. 
Franklin of Harper’s New Monthly describes this effect: 
“Rich farms are laid waste. The plow turns no more furrows. The scythe cuts no more 
bending grain. The farmer's barns are no more loaded down with the fruitful harvest. The 
farmer himself, with his homespun clothes, is seen no more in the fields. All is changed! 
The farm is sold! The old man and his grown-up sons are worth millions, and the old 
homestead is deserted forever.”72 
 
Furthermore, the oil industry was perceived to be and to the credit of the journalists of the  
time, was very speculative and risky. A special New York Times report highlights this belief 
when the reporter states how “we find that speculation runs to an excess which would do no 
discredit to the richest mining placers of California or Nevada.”73 Numerous stories highlighted 
the great wealth to be made, such as Orange Noble and George Delameter in 1863, whom 
invested $4,000,000 and earned more than $5 million.74 The reality, much like the California 
gold rush, was that few ventures ever matched their initial investments and most failed. Morris 
provides a superb description of the public’s perception of the corruption and manipulation 
intertwined with early oil industry: 
“There are wild-cat lands in out-of-the-way places, on the summits of hills and 
mountains, and in vicinities where oil was never heard of, which have obtained a 
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fictitious value, and forced a sale through the representations and efforts of unscrupulous 
and irresponsible parties. Taking opportunity by the forelock, when the public mind has 
been unduly excited by some new oil-discovery, these parties have effected sales of 
property so utterly worthless, except as the basis of a swindle, that the craziest lunatic in 
Oil City would never think of boring on it.”75 
 
During this period oil was used primarily to make kerosene, an inexpensive yet high-
quality illuminating product. The Civil War aided in the growth in the drilling operations for oil 
because of the cutoff of southern turpentine and the disruption of the whaling and whale-oil 
industry. Kerosene, a particular petroleum product, became an economic staple by functioning as 
a burning liquid for lamps, which became very popular for illuminating cities and other urban 
areas. The petroleum products also yielded the lubricants the grease the cylinders, wheels and 
machines of the factories of the manufacturing industry.76  The demand for petroleum products 
escalated to such a decree that even by 1864, existing refineries in the United States were 
inadequate in handling and refining the immense quantities of oil being produced and demand.77  
In the early 1860’s, the industry experienced significant technological improvements in 
transportation and refining procedure, which required significant funds for refineries to remain 
competitive.78 The companies had the decision of either raise capital through debt or equity, or 
consolidate their operations with another firm. However, the developing drilling and refining 
industry brought questions of regulation due the hazardous and particularly flammable nature of 
petroleum products. A New York Times article states how: 
“Persons who have not spent some time in the off regions can scarcely form an idea of 
the frightful effects of such a conflagration in localities where producing wells are 
                                                 
75 Edmund Norris, Derrick and Drill, or An Insight into the Discovery, Development, and Present Condition and 
Future Prospects of Petroleum, in New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, &e, (New York: J. Miller, 1865) 
253-254. 
76 Chernow, Titan, 99. 
77 Montague, 5.  
78 Ibid, 6. Montague describes how developing pipelines, water travel and the use of tank cars for railroad, which 
were more efficient in carrying oil than the clumsy flat cars. Furthermore, in 1866 “a more efficient cylinder 
refining-still was invested, casing and torpedoes were coming to be used in drilling,” which meant a higher level of 
refined oil production.  
Moore 27 
 
numerous. The ground is apt to be forested with derricks, shanties, tanks, &c., all 
saturated with petroleum, and only awaiting the falling of a spark or the scratch of a 
match, to blaze up with fury. Added to this, many parts of the surface are creamy with the 
all-pervading liquid, which settles on a thousand little pools of water or trickles lazily 
toward the nearest creek.”79 
 
Since the United States was the only source of kerosene, and because the United States 
was a much smaller fraction of the world economy than today, most kerosene production was 
exported, primarily to Europe.' In fact, shortly after’s Drake’s discovery, his business associates 
were marketing oil in London and Paris, and Europe soon became the major market for kerosene, 
importing hundreds of thousands of barrels yearly during the Civil War.80 However, before being 
shipped to Europe from Atlantic seaboard ports the crude oil first had to be gathered in the Oil 
Regions fields and transported to refineries, where it was processed into kerosene.81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Union Pacific Corporation 
The Union Pacific Railroad Corporation was created by the combined will of the private 
and public sector. But, more explicitly, the Union Pacific was reliant on the land subsides of the 
                                                 
79“Fires in the Oil Regions,” The New York Times, August 8, 1865. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/1865/08/08/news/fires-in-the-oil-regions.html>. The article goes into more detail about 
the danger and implications of these fires upon the region and its people.  
80 Chernow, Titan, pg 102. 
81 Klein, Benjamin, and Elizabeth Granitz. "Monopolization by "Raising Rivals' Costs": The Standard Oil Case." 
Journal of Law and Economics, 1996: pg 3-5. 
Moore 28 
 
US government. Therefore at its inception, the Union Pacific was a government supported 
enterprise. The growth and sustainability of the Union Pacific was largely subsided by the US 
government both directly or indirectly. The relationship between the government and the Union 
Pacific was a connection in which the railroad company was dependent upon and overly reliant 
on the government.  
The Creation of the Union Pacific Railroad Company 
On July 1, 1862, Congress passed the Union Pacific Act, which created the Union Pacific 
Railroad with the express intention to function as a transcontinental railroad and provide 
additional transportation capacity for military and supply distribution for the Civil War. The act, 
with an amendatory act on the following day, explicated stated that the allocated funds provided 
by the federal government shall "aid in the  construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the  
Missouri  River  to  the  Pacific  Ocean, and  to secure  to  the  government  the  use  of  the  
same  for  postal, military and other purposes."82  
The passage of the act was relatively speedy with broad consensus by the members of 
Congress towards passing the bill. Congressmen Justin Morrill83 made this statement during the 
deliberations in the House: 
“I have been somewhat astonished that a matter of so great importance as this bill should 
claim so small a share of the attention of the House. .  . . Here is a measure in which the 
Government is about to embark, involving the expenditure of hundreds of millions of 
dollars, and yet amendments are offered and voted in, according to the will of the 
gentlemen having charge of the measure, without the slightest apparent interest or 
attention upon the part of a majority of the House as to their character or effect.”84 
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The urgency of the war motivated Congress to expedite the act through the different 
channels of the legislative process to ensure that transportation was effective and efficient on the 
Western Front of the Civil War. Furthermore, the absence of the southern states due their 
secession the element of sectionalism was absent. The passage of the bill marked a shift change 
in US domestic policy in a direction towards the pro-industrial forces of the north. The realities 
of the mobilizing a massive war effort, especially a civil war forced many politicians to abandon 
ideology for the sake of practicality. In the context of the civil war, a railroad network must have 
appeared to be a necessity for the war effort.   
The Act set out to the Union Pacific Railroad Company with a capital stock of 100 
million dollars, which was not being increased beyond the actual cost of its lines; its board of 
directors was to consist of  fifteen  directors  elected  annually  by the  stockholders,  and  five  
government  directors  appointed  by  the President of  the United  States. Annual reports to the 
Secretary of the Treasury (afterward to the Secretary of the Interior) were required of all the 
companies participating in the construction of the Pacific Railway. The establishment of a 
private corporation through public means was by no means a new concept in US history, but the 
scale of this project was revolutionary. The means of regulating this railroad and the corporation 
developing the railroad required an active federal government to ensure no excess or abuse was 
conducted.   
The federal government granted to the construction companies “a right of way through 
the public lands four hundred feet wide, the right to take material for construction from adjacent 
public land, and twenty sections of public land for each mile of railway constructed.”85   
Furthermore, the act stipulated that for every 20 mile section completed, the government would 
issue 30 year bond with 6 percent interest rates to the companies with certain modifications for 
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amounts dependent on geographical location of construction.86 The use of subsidies on this scale 
further entrenched the federal government into the US economy. Railroads transported the most 
basic and vital resources for public and private need. A nuanced approach was necessary to 
ensure that the government could promote, but not hinder the development of the Union Pacific 
and other railroad projects.  
As security for the repayment of the bonds at their maturity, the United States, according 
to the Act of 1862, retained a first lien on the subsidized railways. Additionally, at least 5 percent 
of the net earnings of each bond-aided company would be annually to its debt to the United 
States and one-half the compensation for services rendered to the government should be likewise 
applied. The companies were required at all times to transmit dispatches and transport mails, 
troops, munitions of war and supplies for the government at a reasonable compensation; and the  
government should at all times be preferred to private persons in the rendering of services.87 
Additional Governmental Subsidies  
A major development in the construction of the railway began in 1864, when the various 
companies building the Pacific railroad requested from Congress a larger subsidy for 
construction and other minor changes in the law.88 The Union Pacific was controlled by the 
former Wall Street operator, Thomas C. Durant.89 Durant and his associates J. Edgar Thomson 
and William Ogden sent up fake storm warnings to leading congressmen that the project was in 
danger. The increased requests had serious implications as to the legitimacy of the Union Pacific 
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project. The reality was the railroad had not made much progress, since it had broken ground at 
Omaha on December 2, 1863.90 The Civil War caused the price of materials to spike and forced 
much of the capable labor to the war effort. The question was whether or not Durant’s request for 
additional resources were for the sake of further inflating the profit of the private investors in 
Union Pacific or were the railroad’s concerns legitimate? 
Congress agreed that the Union Pacific project need the additional resources. Now 
whether or not Congress believed Durant and his associates or if they were influenced or lobbied 
is another question. Congress approved a series of changes in the form of the Pacific Railway 
Act of 1864, which doubled the resources available to the railroad. Although reducing the right-
of-way from 400 to 200 feet, the 1864 Act doubled the land grants for the Union Pacific and 
Central Pacific railroads. The companies would receive 20 sections of land per mile, which was 
divided into 10 alternate sections on each side of the track. Furthermore, Congress granted the 
companies additional funds raising abilities. Before this act, these railroad companies were 
dependent on government subsidy bonds, but the 1864 act allowed the firms to issue equal 
amounts of their own 6-percent, 30-year bonds. So, the company bonds constituted a first 
mortgage on the railroads, the U.S. bonds a second mortgage. The remainder of the act contained 
a number of minor changes that made compliance with government regulations easier. The 1864 
Act made the United States "virtually an endorser of the company's bonds for the full amount of 
its own subsidy," and now both the U.P. and the C.P. could draw on double the amount of 
subsidy granted for each mile of completed road.91 
The companies were bound to construct a "first class railroad," however the bill was 
vague and did not define a "first class railroad." A board of government commissioners, would 
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have to approve each section of the road before the subsidies were released, but this safeguard 
was as futile as a government director said it was;: “Even if the Commissioners have nerve 
enough to reject an imperfectly built Road, yet, the work being done it cannot be undone to any 
great extent.... If you wish a building erected in substantial and perfect manner you must control 
the materials and workmanship as it progresses, rather than rely upon a condemnation of the 
work and a legal controversy after it is finished.”92 The government held a second mortgage to 
secure its loan, but many congressmen regarded the loan as, a gift.  A strong complaint was 
issued during the Congressional debates that "we are asked to confer everything upon this 
company and to receive nothing at their hands."93 The quote highlights a growing concern that 
the railroads were merely an outlet for abuse by the financial elites, like Thomas Durant. Union 
Pacific was far behind its deadlines and was asking for additional subsidies. The appearance of 
this request, especially given the background of the men running the project, displayed the 
dishonest nature of the construction.  
The reality of Union Pacific’s construction highlighted how the business was more 
focused on short-run success rather than its long-run viability. The land distribution system that 
the government was providing to Union Pacific incentivized excessive building and construction 
and not necessarily the quality of the railways. Furthermore, the operators, such as Thomas 
Durant, did not have a long-term stake in the project. These were former Wall Street investors, 
who saw the railroads as a potential for short-term profits. Excessive building of railroads and 
operators with short-term prospects meant that Union Pacific was designed for consistent 
maintenance of existing railways. The business was so focused on building additional tracks that 
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it shifted investments from acquiring high quality materials, developing processes for 
maintaining the track or a proper system of fees for transporting goods or individuals.  
Completion & Growth Period  
The year 1866 marked a resumption of rapid railroad construction.  The fever of 
expansion which possessed the railroad industry had lasting effects in some regions.  Progress 
was especially rapid in the West.  The first transcontinental railway, the joint Central Pacific-
Union Pacific, was completed in 1869.94 The completion of the main line  in May, 1869, was 
appropriately celebrated as a national  achievement  in  all the large  cities in  the  country95 The 
completion of the main line in May, 1869, was appropriately celebrated as a national 
achievement in all the large cities in the country.96 
The advent of investment banking facilitated growth in not only Union Pacific, but the 
general railroad industry. The investment bankers involved included famous banking firms such 
as Jay Cooke and Company.97 The new investors did not guide the railroads into a direction of 
sustain, but instead fueled wild speculation. The results were two different periods of rapid 
growth that ended when the speculative bubbles popped in 1873 and 1893. Each time left the 
railroad in disarray and without a strategy for longevity. Railroads were still the focus of 
manipulative investors, who still only purposes short-term profits at the cost of the firm's health. 
Running parallel with these booms and busts in the railroad industry was the growth of Union 
Pacific as a corporation. Union Pacific, either in an attempt to spread its control and facilitate 
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further economic growth or as a result of bankruptcy proceedings, began a series of mergers and 
acquisitions with competitor railroad firms. 98  
Railroad bubble due to railroad speculation and tarnished image from Crédit Mobilier 
Scandal, but UP recovered with investment from Jay Gould. The panic of 1873 came in the fall 
of the year and was marked by a rapid falling off in business activity and in railroad earnings. 
The depression was due  partly to  the  construction  of  rail- roads at a pace far  in  excess of the 
economic  needs  of  the country, to  the overcapitalization of many  railroads, and  to the over-
expansion of credit.  The end  of  the  postwar  boom found  some railroads  over-expanded  with 
respect to their investments, over-built  in respect to  traffic  and  over-strained with respect to  
their  obligations. The expansion of the railroad network again was hindered for a few years as 
the five years from 1874 to 1879 were marked by a protracted depression.  
In 1880, the Union Pacific, Kansas Pacific and Denver Pacific Companies were 
consolidated under the name of the Union Pacific Railway Company. Furthermore, the Central 
Branch Union Pacific became a part of the Union Pacific system in the consolidation of 1880.99 
Then by reason of the competition of new lines of railway west of the Missouri River, the policy 
of building branch lines and absorbing other lines was followed until, in 1893, the Union Pacific 
system contained 8167 miles, of which only 1823 miles were owned directly by the Union 
Pacific Railway Company, the remaining 6344 miles being controlled through ownership of 
stock, leases, contracts and a variety of other relations.100 
However, Union Pacific was not alone in its efforts to expand. Numerous railway 
companies appeared over the course of the second industrial revolution. The introduction of 
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many new firms along with the increasing construction efforts of existing railroads bred a 
railroad war. The war was over prices as railroads lay tracks parallel to each other. Eventually, 
dramatic price cutting battles dominated the industry and bankrupted numerous firms. The failed 
investments resulting from these firms fueled the panic of 1873 and 1893. The unintentional 
consequence of the government’s subsides of the early entrants into the railroad industry was 
massive speculative bubbles that devastated the US economy in 1873 and 1893. The initial 
investors, who had primarily profited off construction paid by the government, appeared to have 
earned their wealth from the actual railroad company. The initial success of these investors 
fueled additional investor, which in turn increased the value of railroad stocks. 
Starting in 1889 and through 1892, the company enjoyed a surplus of earnings as follows: 
1889, $2,492,440.57, 1890, $1,886,692.22; 1891, $1,910,390.34; 1892, $2,649,518.07. The 
disastrous year 1893, however, resulted in a deficit of $432,451.68. 101 The year 1893 was 
marked by another financial panic which depressed business for the subsequent five years. When 
default on interest obligations became inevitable, the property of the company was placed in the 
hands of receivers in October, 1893. Several parts of the system, such as the Kansas Pacific, the 
Union Pacific, Denver and Gulf, and the Oregon Railway and Navigation Lines, were placed in 
the hands of separate receivers to rebuild their business operations before being unified as a 
singular company again. The deficit for the year ending June 30, 1894, was $6,503,004.66 and 
for 1895 the deficit was $1,907,054.82.102 In 1896, Union Pacific was affected by a depression 
touched off by domestic monetary concerns, which caused freight rates fell to their all-time 
lowest. These conditions were responsible for there being only about 30,000 miles of road 
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constructed from 1894 to 1903, which was considered to be considerably less than the expected 
miles of track.103 
Crédit Mobilier of America Scandal 
A key incident in the history of Union Pacific and shall be examined separate from the 
chronological history of the company was the Crédit Mobilier of America scandal. Crédit 
Mobilier was one of the construction companies of the Union Pacific railroad.  Instead of paying 
for the direct construction of the railroad, the stockholders of the budding Union Pacific formed a 
separate corporation for the purpose of building the railroad. George Francis Train and Thomas 
C. Durant formed the Crédit Mobilier in 1864. The creation of this different company allowed 
the investors to hire themselves to construct the railroad while simultaneously shielding them 
from the accusation that they were using the construction phase of the Union Pacific project to 
attain excessive profits. The investors were essentially creating a company to charge the 
government additional fees and expenses during construction.  
Disputes between key factions in the two corporations led to the decision to concentrate 
all control of the two companies to 7 prominent stockholders as trustees.104 All  the  securities of 
the Union Pacific Railroad Company, all government subsidy bonds, first mortgage bonds, land 
grant bonds, income bonds and stock, were given to the 7  trustees to pay for railway 
construction. The trustees then distributed all of these list securities to the stockholders. It was an 
attempt to mislead the US government and the public of the appearance that Crédit Mobilier was 
independent of the Union Pacific Railroad. Furthermore, it was an attempt to portray Crédit 
Mobilier as a company that had been impartially chosen chief construction contractor and 
construction management firm for the Union Pacific Railroad project. 
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The Union Pacific established contracts with Crédit Mobilier to build the Union Pacific 
railway. The Crédit Mobilier used these funds to buy stock and bonds in the Union Pacific at par 
value and then sold the bonds on the open market for a large profit. The result was that the U.S. 
Congress paid $94,650,287 and $50,720,959 to the Union Pacific and Crédit Mobilier. The deal 
generated $43,929,328 in profits, counting at par value the shares and bonds that Crédit Mobilier 
paid itself. The Crédit Mobilier directors reported this as a cash profit of only $23,366,319.81.105 
Union Pacific’s corporate officers did not directly pay for the construction of the railroad 
because the expenses for the construction would have been exposed to public scrutiny. Investors 
would have been unable to yield large profits immediately through construction. So, the 
intermediary company allowed for the Union Pacific railroad company to present genuine 
invoices to the US government for construction costs. These invoices were generated by Crédit 
Mobilier and given to the Union Pacific Railroad for payment. The railroad then requested 
payment for these bills with a small fee for the Union Pacific's overhead expenses. 
From an external perspective, Crédit Mobilier appeared to be a great corporation because 
of its major contract with the Union Pacific. Crédit Mobilier was the exclusive construction and 
management agent for the building of the Pacific Railroad. Crédit Mobilier's corporate balance 
sheet regularly showed high revenues well above its expenses and therefore large profits in every 
quarter that it was constructing the Union Pacific railroad.106 
The profits that Crédit Mobilier offered were essentially the subsidies allocated by the US 
government. These investors were considering or managing with hopes of future success for 
Union Pacific as a business enterprise. The scandal highlighted the reality that many involved in 
the railroad business were focused on the profits of the construction of the railways rather than 
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from  its  future  operation. The Crédit Mobilier was a means for the Union Pacific investors to 
ensure themselves the profits of construction without dealing with the risk of future operation. 
The reality of the time was that similar construction companies were used on many other 
railroads, especially the Pacific railroads.107 
Several key congressional members were implicated in the resulting scandal associated 
with Crédit Mobilier. In 1867, Congressman Oakes Ames offered his fellow congressional 
members' shares of the Crédit Mobilier at a discounted value much lower than the market 
value.108 The individual allowed to purchase shares at a discount could attain enormous capital 
gains by selling their discounted shares in the open market. These members of Congress voted to 
appropriate government funds to cover the costs of Union Pacific. The Sun, a New York City 
newspaper, broke the story during the 1872 election. The paper opposed the re-election of 
Ulysses S. Grant and several members of his administration were involved. After an 
investigation by a congressional committee, Oakes Ames and James Brooks were expelled from 
their seats in the House.109 Furthermore, Congress attempted to bring suit against numerous 
defendants, including stockholders in the Union Pacific and Crédit Mobilier, but it was 
dismissed.110 
Government Oversight & the Interstate Commerce Act 
The Union Pacific stood in more intimate relation to the government than almost any 
other private person or group in the nineteenth century. During the tumultuous years of1862 to 
1873, as seen in the Crédit Mobilier scandal, the actions of the federal government were more 
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focused on curing the troubles of the company rather than governing rules of the company. 
Union Pacific appeared to have a preferential status with the federal government.111 
In both the Senate and the House of Representatives, a special or standing “Committees 
on Pacific Railroads” existed, whose focus was devoted to mostly bond-aided lines. Over the 
course of the standing committee’s existence, the Attorney-General's Department pursued 
expensive investigations into the railroad companies, such as the Crédit Mobilier scandal. 
The Interstate Commerce Act was established in 1887 as a reaction by the federal 
government to increasing monopolistic activities in the US economy. It established the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. However, it was ineffective at first, as seen through cases such as ICC 
v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co.112  The Interstate Commerce Act 
established the first comprehensive regulation of interstate railroad rates and traffic. Although 
individual state governments had attempted similar regulations in their respective jurisdictions, 
railroads were still able to set rates indiscriminately and they could alter those rates to meet 
competition. Railroad traffic had become increasingly competitive and was subject to drastic 
price cutting in times of economic distress or intense competition. Once a rate was cut the 
competitors had to meet it and the result was a price cutting war.113  
The supplemental Act of 1888 to regulate interstate commerce was enacted to strengthen 
the commission’s authority, but the Interstate Commerce Commission's power was inadequate to 
enforce rate regulation effectively and it had no power to make rates. After the depression of 
1873 railroad construction was again resumed. From 1874 to 1893 approximately 120,000 miles 
of rail were laid and the railroad mileage in the United States increased to 176,000 miles in 
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1893.114 Congress expanded the commission's powers through the 1893 Railroad Safety 
Appliance Act, which gave the ICC jurisdiction over railroad safety a traditional authority 
allocated to the states. 
Concluding Remarks 
The Union Pacific Railroad Corporation represents the problems of unsupervised 
government intervention in the US economy. A financial elite, as seen in Thomas Durant, abused 
the subsidies of the US government for short-term profits. The relationship between the US 
government and the Union Pacific was tumultuous over the Second Industrial Revolution. The 
Congress, when corrupted by the influences of the corporate executives, showed contempt for 
the subsidies that they provided to the railroad industry. However, the necessity for a unified 
means for transportation triumphed the excess that resulted from the government’s endorsement 
of it. The result of this relationship was a weak railroad system that experienced diminishing 
revenues towards the end of the second industrial revolution. It is a classic problem of moral 
hazard. The initial investors focused on the short-run life of the corporation ran than maintaining 
a strong and growing stream of revenue. Although, the Union Pacific succeeded in maintaining 
an amicable relationship with the US government, although usually through corruption, the 
company lacked substantive leadership to guide it through the second industrial revolution.  
 
 
JP Morgan & Company 
After the Civil War, the United States’ government expanded its operations to an 
unprecedented level. The new level of growth of government required additional funding and 
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even during the Civil War, the government distributed a series of bonds and notes to raise 
additional funds for the war effort. The growth of financing and government bonds in the US 
economy required a more proactive banking network in the United States. However, in the late 
nineteenth century, the center of the banking market was London. Yet, over the course of the 
second industrial revolution a new banking entity emerged, in the form of JP Morgan & Co., and 
facilitated credit, cheaper financing and a stable banking network in the United States.  
The key focus is therefore on the critical strategic decisions made by the early 
incarnations of JP Morgan & Co that lead to the company’s eventual dominance of the American 
financial market. Furthermore, the growth of the company through this time period was 
accompanied with important decisions and events that would strengthen the company’s ties with 
the US federal government. JP Morgan Co and its earlier incarnations as a company achieved its 
market position by developing investment banking in the US. The company maintained its 
position by ensuring a stable and semi-amicable relationship with the United States government 
throughout the Gilded Age.  
Junius Morgan and the first incarnations of JP Morgan & Company  
The origins of JP Morgan & Co began in 1854 when Junius S. Morgan joined the 
London-based banking business George Peabody & Co., which was headed by George Peabody. 
The company was eventually renamed Peabody, Morgan & Co. as Junius took control of the 
firm. Soon the firm changed its name again to JS Morgan & Co.. The story of JP Morgan & Co. 
during the second industrial revolution is about the buildup of a company just as it became a 
giant.  
Junius’ partnership with Peabody allowed for the Morgan name to develop in the banking 
world and enter the adolescent investment banking community. The entrance of Junius Morgan 
into the financial world with the backing of Peabody created a strong banking environment for 
Moore 42 
 
his son JP Morgan. Junius’ activities and enterprises were located in the financial hubs of the 
second industrial revolution, such as London and New York City. These locations inserted JP 
Morgan into the situations and venues in which the key financial players interacted. JP Morgan’s 
proximity to the developing financial world in the US and the well-established markets in Europe 
allowed him to develop key relationships and experiences in these different markets.115 The 
eventually firm of JP Morgan & Co. developed from Junius’ firms and the partnerships that 
Junius and son created. 
In 1861, JP Morgan formed JP Morgan and Company at 54 Exchange Place with his 
cousin James J. Goodwin, the company functioned as a New York agent for George Peabody and 
Company.116 Beside his basic job duties, JP functioned as intermediary for his father and 
supplied Junius Morgan with political and financial intelligence. Junius placed significant trust in 
his son because the job of gathering intelligence was vital for banks, which required news about 
government financings or the credit of client companies and placed a premium on such 
information.117 Furthermore, the job allowed for JP Morgan to develop a sense of autonomy as a 
business executive in one of the key financial centers of the world. Essential to his job, Pierpont 
generated intelligence briefs for his father, usually in the forms of lengthy letters, outlining 
political and economic conditions in America and posting them on Nassau Street. He reserved 
Tuesday and Friday evenings for these reports.118 The most important idea to glean from all of 
these initial experiences was the role that Junius occupied in his firm. Junius was the central 
director of the firm, which allowed for his different partnerships to work together in unison. 
Union Pacific lacked that sustained directorship, the firm had been manipulated for short-term 
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periods and the overall health of the firm was not connected to the success of the investors. On 
the other hand, Junius’ wealth was inherently bound to the success of his partnerships. Therefore, 
the core of his partnerships and firms was designed to develop in the long-run. He invested in 
key locations and growing an intelligence network for financial information. But most 
importantly, he ensured that his legacy, the basic framework of his different investments was 
sustained by a singular force, his greatest investment, his son JP Morgan.   
However, JP Morgan was not the perfect investor or manager at first. Junius believed his 
son to be rash and sought to teach his son to patient. However, Junius’ attempts to temper his son 
took considerable time. Amid a mad rush of Wall Street profiteering of the civil war, Pierpont 
financed a deal in 1861 that brought on legal woes to the firm and increased tensions with the 
federal government. During the early stages of the civil war, the government sold off obsolete 
weapons to raise funds for the war effort and Arthur M. Eastman purchased five thousand 
obsolete Hall carbines for $3.50 apiece. JP Morgan saw an opportunity to profit from these 
activities and he loaned $20,000 to Simon Stevens, who bought the carbines for $11.50 each. 
Stevens then “rifled” these smooth-bore weapons, which increased their range and accuracy.119 
He resold them to Major General John C. Fremont, commander of the Union forces in Missouri, 
for $22 apiece. Over the course of a three-month period, the government had bought back its 
own, now altered, rifles at six times their original price. The appearance of this transaction 
displayed JP Morgan as a manipulator who put financial gain over allegiance to the United 
States. It yielded any unfavorable reaction from those who knew of the transaction. Many 
questioned how JP Morgan viewed the war? Was he pro-Union, pro-Confederate or for whoever 
won? From this incident, it appears that he valued profit over any sense of patriotism. In fact, JP 
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Morgan had paid a stand-in $300 to take his place when he was drafted after Gettysburg, a 
common practice among the wealthy of the time. The young JP Morgan displayed a reckless 
behavior that concerned his father and soured the image of the Morgan family to the public.   
In 1864, as a response to this JP Morgan’s reckless, Junius orchestrated an alliance 
between the young Pierpont and Charles H. Dabney, thirty years older than Pierpont, to form the 
new firm of Dabney, Morgan and Company. Supplemented with capital from Junius, the firm 
served as Junius’ primary New York agent. Although, JP Morgan experienced an elevation in his 
authority and discretion in making decisions, Junius retained final control over its funds and its 
clientele. Dabney was expected to watch over and teach Pierpont to temper his rash nature.120 
JP Morgan’s business career was elevated with the incorporation of JP Morgan & Co. in 
New York in 1871 and of Drexel, Morgan & Co. with the Philadelphia banker Anthony J. 
Drexel. The new banking partnership functioned as an outlet to Europeans seeking to invest in 
the United States. The explicit focus of these funds was targeted on railroad and government 
finance. Their investing strategy focused on railroad and treasury bonds. The new incorporated 
business and the partnership with Drexel represented a new and more importantly an 
independent venture by JP Morgan into the world of finance. Furthermore, the partnership 
brought JP Morgan explicitly into the world of government financing. The entrance of Pierpont 
into the government financing world intertwined the Morgan’s into a strong relationship with the 
US government. Junius played a large role in the creation of this new business venture of his son 
by not only encouraging JP Morgan to pursue the negotiations with Drexel, but also loaning his 
son $5 million for an equity stake.121 Now as an active lender to the US government and the 
railroads that the government was subsidizing, JP Morgan further interwove his position with the 
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US government. He was no longer just a manipulator of US government goods, but instead he 
was becoming one of the leading suppliers and manipulators of government debt.   
The first defining moment of JP Morgan’s career came in the Panic of 1873 as his firm 
successfully challenged the main financial firm of the time, Jay Cooke & Company. In 1873, 
Washington decided to refund, at lower interest rates, the $300 million in bonded debt remaining 
from the Civil War. Drexel, Morgan & Co. & Junius Morgan & Company in a bid to unseat the 
monopolistic grip of Jay Cooke over federal bonds challenged Cooke for the new issue of bonds. 
The Drexel and Morgan spread rumors that Cooke desperately needed a victory in the contest 
over the federal bonds to recoup losses incurred by the Northern Pacific fiasco. After intense 
pressure from both groups, the secretary of the treasury awarded half of the issue to each of the 
groups.122 The two most important lessons from this clash of the financial firms was, first the 
establishment of Junius and JP Morgan in the highest circles of the financial elite that influenced 
the US economy and government. The conflict shifted influence to Morgans and gave them 
additional access to government bonds. Second, this clash and its results display the growing 
influence of the Morgan’s over the US government and the extent of their influence over key 
government personal.  
The year of 1873 was characterized by unstable financial markets unsettled by the Crédit 
Mobilier scandal, which tarnished reputation the reputation of numerous Congressional members 
and officials in the Grant Administration and risky speculation in the railroad industry. London 
investors grew increasing cautious and skeptical of American bonds, both private and public, to 
the point that one reporter said that investors wouldn’t invest in the bonds “even if signed by an 
angel of Heaven.”123 The instability was further exacerbated by the failure of the financial firm 
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Jay Cooke & Company on Black Thursday, September 18th, 1873. The result was a Wall Street 
panic and the closure of the New York Stock Exchange for ten days. Eventually, five thousand 
commercial firms and fifty-seven Stock Exchange firms failed in the panic of 1873. Pierpont and 
his partners weathered the financial storm with a stable profit. The failure of Jay Cooke’s firm 
meant that a power vacuum had formed in the business world and JP Morgan’s firm was 
prepared to fill that void. In the development of the relationship between the US government and 
the Morgans, this stage represents the final part of their dramatic entrance into the US financial 
market. Junius had set the stage with his strategic partnerships, but it took a direct challenge and 
conflict with Jay Cooke to establish the power of the Morgans. The failure of numerous firms 
left the Morgans, whom had already established key relationships in Europe, as the life-line for 
many powerful foreign investors. The influence associated with this power and the exodus of 
many powerful financial firms left the Morgans in a powerful position to dominate not only the 
financial industry, but most of the US economy. 
The Morgans’ relationship with European Investors  
JP and Junius Morgan used the devastation of the panic of 1873 to elevate the status of 
their firms. The panic had ruined the fortunes of numerous European investors, who loss an 
estimated $600 million in just American railroad stocks. Many of investors looked for a firm to 
stabilize the industry or at least ensure stability in their investments. The failure of the 
speculative railroad companies greatly influence JP Morgan, who saw their failures as lesson to 
invest in only financially secure firms. He claimed that  
“The kind of Bond which I want to be connected with are those which can recommended 
without a shadow of doubt, and without the least subsequent anxiety, as to the payment of 
interest, as it matures.”124    
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Eventually, JP Morgan attempted to stabilize the railroad industry, but following the 
panic of 1873, he first sought to reassure investors in investing with his firm. Soon after the 
panic, the Morgans became major players in the financial industry. Their major advantage was 
their strong connection to European creditors and investors. As a youth, JP Morgan had spent 
extensive time in London, the banking capital of the world, working on banking and finance.  
During his time there, he extensively studied the European financial industry and the banking 
community. On behalf of his father, he developed strategic relationships with the major financial 
institutions of Europe, especially Britain and Germany. 125 JP Morgan became the link between 
the United States’ business community, the US government and international financial 
community after the crisis of 1873.126 
Following the panic of 1873, European investors demanded that investment bankers, such 
as JP Morgan would not only ensure the safety of their investment, but also tasked them “with 
shoring up periodic crises of faith in the value of the dollar and the soundness of the banking 
system.” JP Morgan became famous among the European investment community because 
“within twelve years, JP Morgan spearheaded three efforts to save the American currency and 
banking system.”127 Near the end of the 1870’s, JP Morgan had established himself as a financier 
in his own right. Although he worked for his father and his father’s firm, JP Morgan was 
considered a brilliant financier and well-respected by his peers. The coming sections will focus 
on the parts of the business that JP Morgan devoted a majority of his time and efforts on until his 
father’s death in 1890. These key segments, government and railroads, significantly influenced 
the tactics and methods of JP Morgan & Co. 
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JP Morgan and Railroads  
 The panic of 1873 further stressed to Morgan’s the importance of adherence to the 
Gentleman Banker’s Code and the role of the lender as not only an active observer, but manager. 
The 1880’s marked a shift in the investing patterns of JP Morgan and his associates. Although 
they had traditional invested in government securities, the group now set its focus on railroads. 
Morgan had two primary reasons for his entry into the railroad industry. First, he earned large 
profits and commissions through his firms’ underwriting and facilitating of business deals. 
Secondly, Morgan eventually provided stability and assurance to potential investors for a very 
unstable railroad market.128 The combination of increased profits and reputation significantly 
elevated his status as a financier and the power of his firms. 
The mid-1880’s were marked by sharply declining freight rates due to frequent price 
wars. The price cutting was the result of the proliferation of competing railway lines. During the 
1880’s, railroad companies were continuously established by investors hoping to secure a major 
share of the industry. On the hand, new investors or existing firms would establish a railway 
parallel to an existing line. The goal of pressuring preexisting railway lines was to force the 
existing line’s firm to “buy out” the newly formed railway as to avoid pricing cutting wars. 
These railways were called “extortion lines” and frequently undermined the stability of the 
railroad market.129  
In 1885, a dispute arose between the Pennsylvania Railroad and the New York Central 
over a railroad called the West Shore. The West Shore was a railway covertly financed by Jay 
Gould, General Horace Porter and other associates. These men were primarily associated with 
the Pennsylvania Railroad as major equity holders. The line ran parallel with the New York 
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Central. The result was a fierce price cutting war between the West Shore and the New York 
Central, which hammered down stock and bond prices for both companies. William H. 
Vanderbilt, owner of the New York Central, reacted with the idea of establishing the South 
Pennsylvania Railroad that would parallel to the Pennsylvania Railroad.130 
The timing of this feud was ill-timed because the US stock market took a plunge in 1883, 
which caused a near-panic in American rail stocks in London. New York Central was especially 
hurt by this decline as its stock value fell below par for the first time and its dividend was halved. 
By 1885, the Western Shore was in the hands of a receiver in bankruptcy court and New York 
Central was deferring critical maintenance to remain solvent.131 Eventually, the international 
financial community began to demand that someone step in to stabilize the US railroad industry, 
JP Morgan, who held significant interests in New York Central, took up the cause. He personally 
reached out to and invited Chauncey Depew, New York Central’s President and George H. 
Roberts, Pennsylvania Railroad’s President, to meeting to reconcile the feud.  
On July 20, 1885, JP Morgan told the men of the displeasure of European investors with 
American railroads and then facilitated the discussion of the men. Slowly, JP Morgan guided the 
men towards a compromise, later called the Corsair Compact132 or the Great Railroad Treaty of 
1885. The agreement was that the South Pennsylvania Railroad was sold to the Pennsylvania 
Railroad for $3.5 million dollars and the New York Central Railroad purchased the West Shore 
Railroad for $22 million dollars. As the arbitrator, Morgan profited $3 million dollars.  
The actual transfer of railways was done in a dubious manner and was challenged in the 
courts. The sale was conducted through JP Morgan, who functioned as an intermediary and then 
sold the line onto the other firm. In 1892, the state supreme court of Pennsylvania ruled that the 
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Pennsylvania Railroad could not acquire control of its rival line through an intermediary sale to 
JP Morgan. But the ruling came far too late as deal had already been a profit for the competing 
railroad financier.133 
Following his famous Corsair Compact, JP Morgan began his intervention into the 
railroad industry. Morgan’s firm provided an array of financial expertise and skill to many of the 
troubled railroad companies. Morgan’s firms provided two major benefits to the railroad 
industry, first it function as a facilitator of credit from Europe and the smaller American market.  
The railroad industry was in the growth phase of its industry life, which meant fast-growth, but 
that these companies often experienced significant liquidity and asset management problems. 
However, the key service that Morgan’s firm provided was active management.  
The demand for more stability in the US economy changed the role of banks in the 
operations of the major US corporations and forced the bankers, such as JP Morgan, to “invent 
elaborate schemes to reassure investors of their ability to maintain control.”134 However, the 
initial result of these complex schemes, which were intended foster investor trust, instead created 
deep distrust among the broader public. The reaction forced JP Morgan to use the voting-trust 
agreement to operate businesses. The agreement stipulated that shareholders who benefited from 
his financial engineering had to assign the voting rights for their shares to bankers for a period 
that Morgan deemed sufficient to ensure the future health of the company involved.135 
The financial firm gave financial advice, hired and fired managers, engineered or fended 
off takeovers, and monitored investment.136 A key technique utilized by JP Morgan & Co, to 
maintain corporate policy cohesion, was the placement of key representatives on corporate 
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boards to maintain business governance in its interests.137 Morgan’s ability to infuse his people 
into the companies helped stabilize the return on the investments that his firm made into these 
companies. However, the ethical implications of Morgan’s actions were far-reaching and 
challenged the role of banks in the US economy.138 
In this role, Morgan’s firm could ensure the proper economic return that it desired from 
the firm, even if to the firm’s detriment. The installation of key people in this firm with JP 
Morgan connections further ensured that JP Morgan & Co kept a major advantage in the market. 
However, the effect of the this insider status was that Morgan’s firm need to ensure that this 
firms were running successful while JP Morgan & Co. held a vested interest in the firm. 
Therefore, the firm needed to be financial successful or at least appear to be successful. From the 
perspective of the key figures in the US Congress at the time, JP Morgan & Co was propping up 
the railroad industry. This perception is key because it feed into the idea that JP Morgan was 
cooperating with the US Federal Government to maintain the solvency, effectiveness and 
viability of a key US industry, railway transportation. Although, there is much debate as to 
whether or not JP Morgan & Co. activities truly helped or hindered the railroad industry, the 
result was favorable or at least a neutral perception from Congress. Cooperation was Morgan’s 
mantra, and strict fiduciary responsibility his game; he had little patience for interference in his 
rule setting. Morgan’s high-handed treatment of businessmen on both sides of the Atlantic was 
increasingly resented. Even some prominent American businessmen joined the public chorus 
against the evils of Wall Street. One railroad company promoter called investment bankers 
‘cannibals of finance.’”139 
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Concurrently, the federal government, after witnessing the instability and excesses of the 
railroad industry and its investors, intervened. The Interstate Commerce Act was established in 
1887 as a reaction by the federal government to increasing monopolistic activities among 
railroad companies. In general sense, the federal government created a unified policy on 
transportation and the general regulation of the railroad corporations in the United States. The act 
established the Interstate Commerce Commission, which in turn was focused on implementing 
the policies laid out in the Interstate Commerce Act. The supporters of the law ranged from 
farmers, investors, small shippers to the railroads, who saw the regulation as a source of 
stability.140 However, within six months of the creation of the Interstate Commission, many of 
the excesses and monopolistic tendencies to sought regulate reappeared after initially 
dissipating.141  
In attempt to create industry wide change, Morgan focused on a top-down approach by 
looking to the industry leaders to create a unified policy and standardized practices. In one such 
effort, JP Morgan brought together several of the major railroad company Presidents in a special 
conference. Inside his home, Pierpont opened a discussion with the men with these simple 
words:  
“The purpose of this meeting is to cause the members of this association to no longer take 
the law into their own hands when they suspect they have been wronged, as has been too 
much the practice heretofore…This is not elsewhere customary in civilized communities, 
and no good reason exists why such practice should continue among railroads.”142 
The conference was focused on developing new laws for the industry and get corporate 
leaders to write agreements for the maintenance of stable rates.143 Pierpont offered the railroad 
presidents a deal: if they refrained from rate-cutting and cutthroat competition, the financiers 
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would stop underwriting competing railways. In December 1888 meeting, Morgan produced a 
gentleman's agreement among the executives to maintain rates for sixty days and then the group 
would reassemble to negotiate additional terms. Another meeting took place in January 1889, 
which yielded plans for a huge centralized group to regulate the entire rail system. The name of 
the group was called the Interstate Commerce Railway Association. It would set rates, arbitrate 
disputes, assign fines to offenders and JP Morgan was to lead the cartel. However, the group 
quickly fell apart due to the pressures of western rate wars among the railroads.144 
JP Morgan made another attempt at establishing railroad stability in a meeting on 
December 15, 1890. He presented a plan for a Western Traffic Association, which was to run by 
a board with one director from each railroad. The association set uniform rates and any railroad 
that cheated was discharged. In a rare comment to a reporter, JP Morgan excitedly stated “Think 
of it—all the competing traffic of the roads west of Chicago and Saint Louis placed in control of 
about 30 men.” The public reaction was harsh as newspapers across the nation identified the 
group an attempt to monopolize the industry or as the New York Herald stated “RAILROAD 
KINGS FORM GIGANTIC TRUST.” 145 The reaction eventually caused the plan to crumble as 
various executives withdrew from the negotiations.  
JP Morgan the Investment Banker 
The underwriting capacities of JP Morgan’s firms were best seen in the development and 
incorporation of General Electrics in 1892. JP Morgan and Co spearheaded the financial end of 
the creation and introduction of General Electric in the US economy. The significance of JP 
Morgan Co.’s actions was the scale of GE’s operations and of the equity that was being 
underwritten. In a general sense, the introduction of GE as a publicly traded company was one of 
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the largest public incorporated companies at the time and held numerous implications for the 
entire US economy. The deal held numerous benefits for JP Morgan Co.. First, the image of the 
deal to the federal Government was the unification of several companies and Thomas Edison’s 
flagship company.  
The fundamental goal of amassing such a large company was as to more effectively 
utilize a larger corporate structure to reduce collective costs, increase collective revenues and 
potentially increase net employment. Therefore, from a corporate perspective the unification was 
perceived to be an extraordinary and potentially successful business venture that helped grow the 
US economy. The public policy perspective was positive as well because Congressional 
members and the executive branch saw the larger company as increasing overall employment. 
The belief was that a more monopolistic firm was a tolerable trade-off for increased employment 
at a perceived level of adequate wages.  
On April 8, 1890, Junius Morgan died, however Junius’ death did not mark the beginning 
of JP Morgan’s takeover. The reality was that by 1880’s as Junius began to experience health 
problems, he slowly conceded control of his firms to his son. Then in June 1893, Anthony 
Drexel died and in October 1893, his son Anthony Drexel chose to retire. The removal of these 
key players enabled JP Morgan to strengthen his hold over the interlocking partnerships in New 
York, Philadelphia, Paris and London.  
It is a partner in the London banking of JS Morgan & Co. and the Paris house of Morgan, 
Harjes & Co. In a general sense, JP Morgan’s firms played a unique banking role through the 
development of the second industrial revolution. In the general banking market, JP Morgan’s 
banks held the important role of accepting consumer and business deposits and paying interest 
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upon those deposits in a similar fashion to any other commercial bank.146 The commercial like 
function of JP Morgan’s firm highlights the key fact that the development of investment banks 
during the second industrial revolution created a gray area in terms of the capabilities and reach 
of these banking entities. In Morgan’s case, his firm operated in various forms of banking and 
with a variety of customers, from corporate entities to particular individuals.  
Furthermore, JP Morgan’s businesses functioned as a large lender of money on the NYSE 
and were therefore a major issuing house for US securities.147 This issuance of debt financing 
was key especially during the second industrial revolution because it allowed for major 
corporations to maintain solid liquidity figures and ensure that their operations could be 
maintained daily. The impact of this continuous operation would further enhance and strengthen 
the economic growth of this time period.  
The Panic of 1893 & The Infamous Deal of 1895 
The intervening power of JP Morgan, through his various partnerships and firms, was 
best displayed through the panic of 1893. Primarily due to excessive speculation in railroad 
industry, the US plunged into a recession in 1893, which caused major bank runs and European 
investors to shift significant portions of capital away from the US. Now, the head of the various 
partnerships, JP Morgan faced the panic of 1893. The panic of 1893 led to the failure of almost 
15,000 commercial firms and the collapse of over 600 banks. The failure of numerous businesses 
led to extraordinary opportunity for JP Morgan and other key financial agents to reorganize these 
businesses to exert additional control. A key company that JP Morgan rescued from failure 
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during the panic was General Electric and thus insured the large company’s loyalty to Morgan 
and his firms.  
Over a third of US railroad companies fell into receivership and bankruptcy proceedings 
due to the panic. Excessive debt, overbuilding and price cutting wars set during a major 
economic recession doomed many of these firms. Yet again, European and American investors 
pleaded with JP Morgan to stabilize the railroad industry.148 JP Morgan accepted the task; 
however in reaction to his previous failures, he chose an alternative method of controlling the 
industry. He, through his various partnerships and firms, reorganized the railroads in bankruptcy 
and designed their corporate structure to his advantage. During the reorganization process, the 
majority of the company’s stock was transferred to special voting trusts, which were usually 
controlled by JP Morgan or one of his associates. In fact, investors scrambled to give up their 
stocks in return for the trust certificates that Morgan and his associates offered.149 
Numerous firms underwent his reorganization, such as Erie, Chesapeake and Ohio, 
Philadelphia and Reading, Santa Fe, Northern Pacific, Great Northern, New York Central, 
Lehigh Valley, Jersey Central and the Southern Railway. JP Morgan placed himself as a giant of 
the US stock market because railroads compromised 60 percent of all issues on the New York 
Stock Exchange at the time. JP Morgan made sure no intervention from the government was all 
but guaranteed by issuing free passes to key politicians. The reality at the end of the crisis was 
best put by Sereno S. Pratt, an editor for the Wall Street Journal, who claimed that JP Morgan’s 
“power is not to be found in the number of his own millions, but in the billions he was the 
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trustee.”150 In 1895, while dealing with all of these events, JP Morgan reorganized all of the 
partnerships and firms that Junius and he had established under the control of his renamed New 
York branch, JP Morgan and Company.151 
However, while JP Morgan was reorganizing the railroad industry and his firms, the 
panic was acutely affecting the US Treasury when it ran low on gold reserves. Since 1879, the 
US government had pledged to redeem dollars for gold in an effort to maintain the gold standard. 
In order to reassure investors and back up this claim, the US Treasury had a policy of 
maintaining at least $100 million in gold coin and bullion. A major conflict running parallel with 
JP Morgan’s development in the banking industry was battle between the use of gold and silver 
for the US currency standard.  
A major political crisis concerning gold versus silver arose in the early 1870’s. Congress 
in 1873 passed the controversial Coinage Act, which was also called the Fourth Coinage Act or 
Mint Act. The act embraced the gold standard and de-monetized silver. It further instigated a 
battle between pro-gold and pro-silver forces. Silver advocates called the act the "Crime of '73" 
and demanded restoration of free coinage. Congress also passed the Specie Payment Resumption 
Act of January 14, 1875, which restored the nation to the gold standard through the redemption 
of previously issue US financial notes. The act contracted the nation's money supply. 
In 1877, Congressman Richard P. Bland and Senator William B. Allison proposed a bill 
that would bring back silver coinage. Major banks and companies pressured the president, 
Rutherford B. Hayes to veto the proposal, which he did on the final version of the bill, but 
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Congress overrode his veto. The Bland-Allison Act, passed in 1878 required that the government 
purchase from $2 to $4 million worth of silver bullion each month and to coin silver dollars. 
However, most of the minted money was not placed in circulation, but was instead retained in 
government vaults. Later, Congress passed the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890, which 
require that the US Treasury had to buy 4.5 million ounces of silver monthly and issue 
certificates redeemable in gold or silver.152 It was repealed by Congress in 1893. 
During 1894, the US gold reserve dipped below the $100 million floor as the inflow of 
silver drove out gold out the US. It was described as a flight of capital as gold bullion fled the 
US government and in many cases back to Europe.153 Investors began to speculate as to when the 
government would declare its inability to redeem dollars for gold.  The low gold reserves further 
exacerbated the financial crisis and with no central bank to unify American monetary policy 
many in the business and economic community were uncertain and pessimistic about investing in 
the US market. President Grover Cleveland faced a congress that favored free coinage instead of 
gold and refused to replenish the gold reserve through a public bond offering. By January 24, 
1895, the US treasury’s gold reserves declined to $68 million.  
The crisis became prompted President Grover Cleveland, in a move that would hurt his 
public image, to accept an offer from JP Morgan & Co. to facilitate a new distribution of US 
treasury notes. JP Morgan laid out a bold plan that involved Morgan and Rothschild firms 3.5 
million ounces of gold, at least half from Europe, in exchange for about $65 million worth of 30 
year bonds. There were questions as to the legality of the actions by the government, but JP 
Morgan used an 1862 statue that had granted the Lincoln Administration emergency powers to 
buy gold during the Civil War. However, as controlling as JP Morgan appeared in this situation, 
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the reality was far from this appearance. He wired his London house this statement “We consider 
situation critical; politicians appear to have absolute control. If fail & European negotiations 
abandoned, it is impossible overestimates what will be result U.S.”154  
Although, JP Morgan & Co held an unfavorable public image, the professionalism and 
skill of the firm were widely recognized by the government and banking professionals. However, 
JP Morgan & Co. did not provide its services to the government for free, and earned roughly $6 
to $7 million to underwrite the bond issue.155 JP Morgan & Co. was chosen because of its 
professional connections to the wealth European credit markets that many businesses and 
governments were unable to reach. The public reaction was fierce. William Jennings Bryan 
denounced the sale on the floor of the House. The New York World declared that the syndicate 
had been composed of “bloodsucking Jew and aliens.” President Cleveland was denounced as a 
tool “of Jewish bankers and British gold.” A less racial declaration made by a major house organ 
of the Farmers’ alliance stated that “the great bunco game played in Washington by which the 
people have been defrauded of over $8 million.” In the eyes of the public, Cleveland had sold the 
nation’s credit to the Morgans and Rothschilds and then amplified the evil deed by sharing in the 
profits.156 
Morgan’s actions were not atypical, in fact between 1884 and 1907, he led three efforts to 
preserve the American financial system and from which his firms earned large financial rewards 
and public outrage each time.157 However, the significance of this event was how it publically 
displayed the dependence of the United States’ economy on the actions of a key industry, the 
financial sector. Furthermore, that the viability of the financial sector was interconnected with 
                                                 
154 Ibid, pg 75. 
155 Fear and Kobrak, pg 721. The syndicate purchased the bond from the government at 104 ½ and sold them at the 
opening price of 112 ¼.  
156 Alyn Brodsky, Grover Cleveland: A Study in Character, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000) pg 365. 
157 Fear and Kobrak, pg 721. 
Moore 60 
 
the government’s operations and continual maintenance. The actions of JP Morgan & Co 
highlight the unique relationship that this firm held with the federal government during the 
second industrial revolution. A reality that is frequently ignored in this situation was that 
although JP Morgan & Co was one of the more established investment banks of the United 
States, it was not the only one. The relationship that JP Morgan & Co. maintained with the 
Federal Government and the influence that the firm could exerted over certain policy makers 
allowed for it to be chosen. The key idea is that Morgan’s firm was able to facilitate this 
necessary transaction and further increase its reputation as a reliable, although not necessarily a 
ethical banking institution was because of the healthy relationship it had developed with the 
Federal government.   
However, the downside of the JP Morgan & Co’s actions, such as the pricing of equity 
issues and the resulting profits was negative reaction by the general public. A significant and 
underlying idea during the second industrial revolution was the public opinion of JP Morgan & 
Co. and the JP Morgan, the man, was negative. However, the firm focused on maintaining a 
healthy and positive opinion among their limited regulators, the US Federal Government and the 
particular state governments its business operations were in. So the developing power and 
influence of JP Morgan became to be perceived as a detriment to the public good of the United 
States by the public, key members of Congress and even key bankers whom recognized the need 
for more public control of the financial system.”158 
Concluding Remarks 
The significant factor that allowed Morgan to maintain these arrangements was the 
healthy relationship that his firm maintained with the government. In contrast, to Rockefeller and 
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Standard Oil, JP Morgan & Co choose a more diplomatic route in interacting with the federal 
and state governments. The result was that Morgan’s operations were better able to function 
under the minimal government supervision applied to it. But even more importantly, the 
relationship would be important when investigations into these activities were initiated and the 
relationship between the two entities was key to JP Morgan’s survival.  
JP Morgan & Company, its affiliates and the predecessor organizations that made up the 
history of the financial institutions survived the basic litmus test established in this argument. 
Through the specified time period, JP Morgan & Co. passed the first tenant of the test by 
retaining and actually growing its operations. The firms maintained its based operations, officers 
and guiding mission. Unlike many of its peers both within and outside of the banking industry, 
the firm was broken up or dissolved. Instead, it thrived and grew its operations nationally and 
internationally. On the second tenant, JP Morgan & Co. maintained its market dominance and 
relative share in the banking industry. Although, the company was subject to numerous 
investigations and was at the center of numerous public outcries, it did not lose its competitive 
edge or placement. The firm maintained it position and the wholeness of its operations, which 
became an increasingly difficult task, especially through the Progressive Era immediately 
following the Gilded Age.  
These two objectives were achieved through the stable and mutual beneficial relationship 
that JP Morgan enjoyed with the US Federal government. Although there existed a great 
asymmetry between the results that both parties received, with JP Morgan & Co receiving a more 
generous return than the US Federal government, there existed a neutral tone between both 
parties. But this neutrality was of perception of each other because other entities cooperated with 
each other in many instances to mutually benefit each other. However, the tone of neutrality was 
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maintained due the negative public perception of JP Morgan & Co and the banking industry as a 
whole. Yet, the success of JP Morgan was seen through its ability to generate significant return 
through its interactions with the government without seceding its autonomy as a business.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard Oil Company 
In examining Standard Oil and its relationship with the US federal government, it is 
impossible to ignore the actions and words of John D Rockefeller. In many senses, Rockefeller 
was Standard Oil or at least during the Gilded Age. In contrast to the Union Pacific, Standard Oil 
maintained a high degree of autonomy from the US government and from most levels of 
government in general. The business philosophy Rockefeller chose to pursue and his beliefs on 
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the role of government in the economy or at least in regulating private enterprise, specifically his 
company, was similar to laissez faire. However, as the US government decided to slowly grow 
its control and regulation of the economy, the two organizations began to clash. The relationship 
during the Gilded Age was one of friction, as Standard Oil attempted to maintain its market share 
and its autonomy of the US government.  
Standard Oil’s Origins 
John D. Rockefeller began his venture into the oil industry in 1863 by providing capital 
for the new refining company, Andrews, Clark and Co. John Rockefeller and Maurice Clark, a 
family friend and business partner, pledged $4,000 for half the working capital of the new 
company with Samuel Andrews to create the refining company. At the time the men considered 
it a small side business to supplement their jobs and investments as they expressed how their 
refining business was “a little side issue, we retaining our interest in our business as produce 
commission merchants.”159 
Andrews was the refining expert of the group due to his experience in the lard-oil 
refining business and used a special technique using sulfuric acid, which at the time was highly 
secretive and sought after by numerous business interests.160 The new refining business was a 
part of a new breed of business people that developed during the second industrial revolution, 
“the middleman.” The new “middleman” group functioned as an intermediary between the raw-
material producers and the consumers or retailers.161 In the case of petroleum products, refining 
became a dominant industry that functioned as the “middleman” from the drilling stage to the 
actual consumption.  
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Rockefeller’s strategy focused on transportation outlets and paths as way of gaining 
advantages over his rivals. His choice for an initial refinery displays his strategic tendencies; 
Rockefeller exercised an option for a three-acre piece of land on the banks of a waterway called 
Kingsbury Run, which flowed into the Cuyahoga River and into Lake Erie. A mile and a half 
away from downtown Cleveland, the refinery’s location appeared inconvenient and possibly 
hindering to the company’s success because of the plant’s distance from the city. However, 
Rockefeller realized the inconvenience was greatly outweighed by the fact that it was near newly 
established railroad tracks, which were completed by November of 1863. The result was that 
Rockefeller’s company was able to travel by water or land, which gave him critical leverage 
when negotiating for preferential rates on transportation.162  
The refining business was wildly profitable for Rockefeller and his associates, oil had 
been put to a wide variety of uses during the Civil, such as treating wounds or functioning as a 
substitute for turpentine, so demand was high. During these early years, Rockefeller discovered 
his passion for detail and organization and the application of these skills to a business 
environment. Rockefeller’s influence on the oil industry and the general business community 
stemmed from his ability to able this stability to a turbulent and young industry.163  
Rockefeller’s joint ownership was about to end. Rockefeller, Clark and Andrews held 
drastically divergent views about the future of oil and the appropriate pace of expansion for their 
business. The firm had banked solid profits in refining every year of the Civil War,164 yet at the 
same time prices were incredibly volatile due the war, increasing competitive pressures and 
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additional discoveries in oil wells. The price fluctuations in a year would veer between $.10 and 
$10 a barrel in 1861 and $4 and $12 in 1864. However, Andrews and Rockefeller wanted to 
borrow more intensively and expand the firm’s operations, while Clark was wary of this 
ambitious approach.165 Furthermore, due to the growing operations and need for capital, two 
other members of the Clark family had joined the business, however the result was that the three 
Clarks effectively decided the policy of the firm and could override Rockefeller’s decisions. So, 
in 1865, Rockefeller and Andrews dissolved their partnership with the Clarks and Rockefeller 
paid $72,500 in an auction for the business.166 
At the age of 25, Rockefeller now owned the largest refinery in Cleveland, which could 
refine 500 barrels of crude oil a day, twice the production capacities of tis nearest local rival. The 
new business was named Rockefeller & Andrews. In December 1865, Rockefeller & Andrews 
opened a second refinery, the Standard Works. By 1866, two-thirds of the Cleveland kerosene 
was flowing overseas and was usually routed through New York. So in the same year, in an 
attempt to develop trade in the international oil market, Rockefeller & Andrews set up a new 
firm called Rockefeller and Company in New York to oversee the exports of the Cleveland 
Refineries. The firm’s goal was to use the international market to consume the excess production 
of the refineries. Rockefeller himself stated that “it seemed absolutely necessary to extend the 
market for oil by exporting to foreign countries, which required a large and most difficult 
development.”167 The significance of this decision was Rockefeller’s recognition of the 
international market’s importance and ability to affect price movement.  
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Due the increasing growth in the oil market and increasing number of drilling operations, 
the prices for oil were in constant flux. When the announcement of a new oil well reached New 
York, international buyers, expecting lower prices, could simply stop buying and wait until the 
price drop, which of course gave them significant power in negotiations. Rockefeller described 
them as “vultures,” who would not “buy until the price of refined had fallen very low on account 
of the flood crude oil in the market.”168 The new firm in New York would apprise the buyers in 
the Oil Regions of sudden drops in export prices so they could temporarily curtail crude oil 
purchases and the proximity to Wall Street was critical as well.  
The firm was need of massive capital investments for its ambitious expansion schemes. 
However, traditional bankers viewed the oil industry, with a good deal of justification, as very 
risky169 and would rather invest in railroads or government projects. The firm needed credit 
beyond the meager resources and limits of the Cleveland banks, which ultimately meant the 
company had to go to Wall Street. Furthermore, the New York bankers could offer more 
advantageous rates. For John D. Rockefeller, this move was a major turning point in business 
ventures because of his outspoken suspicion of financiers. From his perspective, the company 
“had to the banks—almost on knees—to get money and credit” and the meeting frequently left 
him stressful and worrisome about the debt they were acquiring.170   
After buying out the remaining shares from his partner, Rockefeller expanded the 
business from kerosene oil to general petroleum products, such as benzene, paraffin and 
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petroleum jelly.171 The effective result of this transaction was the unilateral control that 
Rockefeller was able to exert over the operations of the firm. Rockefeller initially placed 
headquarters in Cleveland even as production and refinement expanded to other parts of the 
country. 
The next stage of the firm’s growth was the in March of 1867, when Rockefeller 
established a new partnership named Rockefeller, Andrews and Flager located in Cleveland. The 
new partnership came as the result of a major negotiation between Rockefeller and Stephen V. 
Harkness for a capital investment of $100,000, a third of the new firm’s capital.  Harkness made 
a requirement in the deal that Henry Flager,172 a business associate, who introduced Rockefeller 
to Harkness, be made treasurer and his personal deputy in the firm. Harkness helped integrate the 
firm better with the business community because he was a director of banks, railroads, mining, 
real estate and manufacturing companies.173 The new firm was the combination of several 
existing refineries; William Rockefeller & Co., Rockefeller & Andrews, Rockefeller & Co., S.V. 
Harkness, and H.M. Flager.174   
Rockefeller maintained his operations in Cleveland because of the transportation 
capabilities; it was the hub of an extensive transportation, which afforded Rockefeller and his 
associates’ significant leverage in freight negotiations. In particular, Cleveland had access to the 
Erie Canal, Lake Erie, the New York Central Railroad, the Erie Railroad, the Pennsylvania 
Railroad and the all transportation networks connected to them. Rockefeller’s firm “could load 
their oil in the season of lake navigation and canal navigation, upon vessels at Cleveland and 
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from Buffalo be the Erie Canal [and] could deliver the oil to warehouses in New York at a cost 
lower than the current rates at which the railway companies had been seeking the business.”175 
The different alternatives allowed for Rockefeller to negotiate advantageous railway rates by 
playing the different major railroad companies against each other to make up the difference for 
having to ship crude oil to Cleveland and then out for sale. Cleveland’s location relative to the 
markets of the eastern United States, but still extended from the coast line, fed railways from 
Chicago, Saint Louis, and Cincinnati and therefore became a gateway to West. Eventually, most 
of the refining community seized this competitive advantage and by 1866 the city had 50 
refineries, second to Pittsburgh.176  
The cost saving potential realized through advantageous transportation deals eventually 
lead to various oil-refining hubs attempting to form tactical alliances with the different railroad 
networks. The New York Central and the Erie promoted Cleveland, which meant Rockefeller 
and his business partners became key allies for the railroad’s oil freight business. Soon a battle 
between railroad companies developed over the oil freight business as the Pennsylvania railroad 
decreed that Cleveland would “wiped out as a refining center.”177 The decree caused a panic 
among the Cleveland refiners, whom began to prepare the transfer their operations to a location 
more to the favor of the Pennsylvania Railroad. However, Rockefeller was coolheaded and used 
the panic to his competitive advantage by starting negotiations with the New York Central and 
Erie for a new transportation deal.  The two railroads were fearful of losing substantial oil traffic 
because of the upheaval that appeared to be happening after the Pennsylvania proclamation. 
In 1868, Jay Gould, then owner of Erie Canal, negotiated a deal with Rockefeller that 
gave Rockefeller and Flagler shares in subsidiary company called Allegheny Transportation 
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Company, which owned a large pipeline network to Oil Creek, the major source of crude oil. The 
advantage that Rockefeller’s firm received was a 75 percent rebate on oil shipped through the 
Erie system. Furthermore, Flagler bargained a deal with the Atlantic and Great Western, an Erie 
subsidiary, which gave the refining company advantageous rate on rail shipments between 
Cleveland and the Oil Regions. At the same time, Flagler also negotiated a deal with Lake Shore 
Railroad, a subsidiary of New York Central. The deal gave the refining firm railway rates that 
matched the discounts the Pennsylvania Railroad extended to its customers in the Oil Regions. 
Essentially, Flagler and Rockefeller were able convert the geographic disadvantage their firm 
traditionally experienced into a cost savings measure because the firm only paid $1.45 per barrel 
to ship refined oil to New York rather than the officially listed price of $2.40. In return, 
Rockefeller’s firm assumed liability on certain shipments and promised 60 cartloads of refined 
oil daily. 60 cartloads a day was an ambitious production level beyond even Rockefeller’s limits 
at the time and required extensive coordination among the different refiners in 
Cleveland.178Beyond the financial implications of this deal, an important result was how the 
railroad firms were tied into the success of the oil refining business.   
“The dubiousness of this deal forced it to be done in great secrecy and rest on oral 
agreements as Rockefeller explained later in life: “Our people do not think it would be 
best for the Lake Shore Road, or, to have a contract, but with good faith between us and 
desire to promote each other’s interest, we can serve each other better by being able to 
say we have no contract.”179 
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At this time, the firm was equal in size to the next largest Cleveland refineries combined 
and soon Cleveland outpaced Pittsburgh at the leading refining center. In 1870, the firm of 
Rockefeller, Andrews & Flagler was reorganized into the Standard Oil Company of Ohio.180 
Standard Oil Company of Ohio and then of New Jersey 
 The capital stock of the Standard Oil Company in 1870 was $1,000,000.181 The major 
battle between refiners throughout the 1870’s was for advantageous transportation rates, such as 
the rebates Rockefeller and Flagler secured for Standard Oil. The main strategic plans for the 
industry were to obtain special rates and to organize a large network of oil pipelines to facilitate 
oil transportation.182 Ida Tarbell, the famous critic of Standard, described these rebates and how: 
“Mr. Rockefeller … went to Mr. Vanderbilt and, by a series of arguments and threats 
easy enough to divine, he obtained a secret rebate on his shipments, not so sweeping as 
he had planned, but sufficient to give an advantage over other men; and he did not cease 
his efforts until he had not only a rebate on his shipments over all the oil-carrying roads 
but a drawback on all the oil his competitors shipped over those roads.”183 
 
Although there were technological advantages for the refining equipment and techniques, 
the cost saving associated with transportation was considered a priority.184 Although, the 
pipelines came late due the extensive capital required for investment, Standard effectively 
utilized the rates it secured to dominate the refining industry. Starting in 1870, Standard Oil’s 
advantage in this key area of cost saving helped the firm grow its refined oil output from 4 
percent to 95 percent in 7 years.185 At the beginning of the 1870’s the refining industry consisted 
of hundreds of small firms with low barriers to entry into the industry. Standard Oil Company 
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was located in Cleveland with several of the largest refining centers but accounted for only 
approximately 4 percent of total U.S. refining capacity.186 
 Going into 1871, the rate war between the major railways was still in-effect; however the 
New York Central, the Erie and the Pennsylvania Railroad had completed major transportation 
connections to Chicago. The rate battles forced the companies, such on New York Central to rely 
on the traditional source of oil transportation, mostly Cleveland and its refiners. However, in 
1871, additional discoveries of petroleum throughout Pennsylvania shifted a lot of the oil 
operations to that direction and brought in additional supply for the Pennsylvania Railroad 
Company. The effect of these new discoveries and the shift in business operations greatly 
affected the Erie and New York Central railroads because their main lines were near these newly 
discovered deposits.  
The solution came in the form of a combination of railroad companies and refiners. The 
combination was a contract between the railroads and certain refiners of Pittsburg, Philadelphia, 
and Cleveland, which formed the South Improvement Company. On May 1, 1871, the 
Pennsylvania Legislature created the South Improvement Company with the authority:  
“to construct and operate any work or works, public or private, designed to include, 
increase, facilitate, or develop trade, travel, or the transportation of freight, live-stock, 
passengers, or any traffic by land or water, from or to any part of the United State.”187 
 
The benefit of the scheme for refiners was not only got rebates on their shipments, but 
also received drawbacks, rebates from the full rates paid by nonmember refiners. Daniel Yergin 
describes the purpose of the South Improvement Company as another scheme to stabilize the oil 
industry, but would become the symbol to achieve monopoly control over the refining industry. 
The 1870’s was characterized by an escalating level of crude oil production and although 
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producers repeatedly tried to restrict production to maintain price stability. Over the course of the 
1870s, new territories were continually being drilled and expanded production. Estimates of the 
number of the oil producing firms were as much as sixteen thousand and many of the producers 
were speculative.188   
The public reaction to the company and its mission was fierce; a Pittsburgh magazine 
claimed the company would monopolize the oil of the region, while a Titusville paper warned 
the company was nothing less than a threat to “dry up Titusville.”189 Public protests throughout 
Pennsylvania became commonplace, which launched what was called the “Oil War.” The “Oil 
War” consisted of the railroads, Standard Oil and the other refining colluders against the 
producers, non-member refining companies and the public. In particular, the producers united 
against and boycotted the refiners. The result was disastrous for the Standard refineries in 
Cleveland, which normally employed twelve hundred men; however the boycott left the 
refineries with only crude oil to occupy seventy men.190    
Ida Tarbell described the company as  
“And the contracts were signed — secretly of course. And when they were signed what 
did Mr. Rockefeller do? He swooped down on a great industry in his home town with the 
proof that henceforth he was not only to have rates fully one hundred per cent cheaper 
than his competitors, but he was to have the extra one hundred per cent they paid! And he 
told them they had better sell — at his price; twenty-one out of twenty-six did, and by 
March, 1872, young Mr. Rockefeller was practically the only oil refiner in Cleveland, 
Ohio, where three months before there had been twenty-six.”191 
 
Mr. Rockefeller had seen the oil industry of Cleveland fall into his hands by the panic 
which the contracts with the South Improvement Company had caused. Tarbell argued that 
because Rockefeller could ship cheaper than his competitors and utilize the rebate, that his 
establishment of “a system of espionage on their business, the oil industry of the country would 
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be his in time.”192 Afterwards, Rockefeller allegedly began to deliberately put into effect his 
plans for driving all participants out of the oil business. 
However, in April 1872, the South Improvement Company was dissolved. Yet, 
Rockefeller and his associates developed alternative ways of organizing, to effectively manage 
their fast growing enterprise. In 1882, they combined their disparate companies, spread across 
dozens of states, under a single group of trustees. The thirty-seven stockholders merged their 
shares into a trust of nine Trustees: John and William Rockefeller, Oliver H. Payne, Charles 
Pratt, Henry Flagler, John D. Archbold, William G. Warden, Jabez Bostwick, and Benjamin 
Brewster.193 The development of a trust began the first of a complex web of corporate entities 
that Rockefeller used to control a vast array of companies. Standard's actions and secret transport 
deals helped its kerosene price to drop from $.58 to $.26 from 1865 to 1870.194  
In 1885, Standard Oil of Ohio moved its headquarters from Cleveland to its permanent 
headquarters at 26 Broadway in New York City. Concurrently, the trustees of Standard Oil of 
Ohio chartered the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey to take advantages of the state’s lenient 
corporate stock ownership laws. The move from Cleveland represented the strategic maneuvers 
that Rockefeller made to evade a particular state’s polices or regulations that he felt adversely 
affected him. The tension that Rockefeller experienced with the Federal government was a 
product of the legal battles and shifts in location that he made for his company.  
Acquisitions and Mergers  
Vital to the acquisition strategy of Rockefeller was his ability to maintain and gain 
additional credit. In the corporate mergers and acquisition environment Rockefeller was always 
ready with an abundant reserve of cash, usually borrowed, which allowed him to win bidding 
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wars in buy other refineries. The access to funds required a sophisticated and deep trust between 
Rockefeller and the banks he petitioned for funds. Rockefeller himself describes the way he 
enlisted the necessary funds to buy up a refinery: 
“It required hundreds of thousands of dollars—and in cash; securities would not answer. I 
received the message at about noon…I drove from bank to bank, asking each president or 
cashier, whomever I could find first, to get ready for me all the funds he could…I 
rounded up all of our banks in the city… until I recurred the necessary amount. With this 
I was off on the 3 o’clock train, and closed the transaction.”195 
 
In fact, Rockefeller’s relationship with bankers became so well established that in 1868 
he became a director of the Ohio National Bank. Starting in the 1870’s, Standard Oil, in reaction 
to the oil price instability, developed a new strategy for growth. The strategy focused on buying 
leading refiners to dominate the refining industry’s market share. Rockefeller’s stated objective 
was to eliminate “that cut-throat policy of making no profits” so as to “make the oil business safe 
and profitable” and under Standard Oil’s control. The eventual strategy developed into a carrot 
and stick approach to business negotiations. Standard Oil’s agents approached their targets with 
deference, politeness and flattery and highlighted the profitability of Standard Oil. If the “carrot” 
did not work, then Standard Oil, as Rockefeller described it, gave targeted firms “a good 
sweating.”196 The policy was a series of prices that Standard Oil implemented in the local 
dominion or market of a particular refining company therefore forcing the competitor to operate 
at a loss. In 1879, Standard Oil had control of, through its own and subsidiary operations, 90 to 
95 percent of the US refined oil output.197  Furthermore, Standard Oil controlled the pipelines 
and held lucrative deals with the major transportation networks in the Oil Regions. 
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The Pennsylvania producers reacted to the growth and dominance of Standard Oil with 
an ambitious plan, a long-distance pipeline. The Tidewater Pipeline would travel eastward 110 
miles from the Oil Regions to a connection with the Pennsylvania and Reading Railroad. In May 
of 1879 oil was flowing in the pipeline and it was considered a significant technological 
advancement and function as a major competitor to railroads for oil transportation.198 Standard 
Oil, fearing loss of market share and industry control, developed 4 long distance pipelines from 
the Oil Regions to Cleveland, New York, Philadelphia, and Buffalo. Furthermore, Standard 
acquired a minority stockholder in Tidewater and negotiated an arrangement to pool shipments 
with the new pipeline company to manage competition.  
The other method of reaction and attack on Standard Oil began in late 1870s through the 
political system of the United States and the court system. The major oil producers launched a 
series of legal attacks against Standard Oil for discriminatory rates and sought criminal 
indictment of its principal officers for conspiracy. Concurrently, a series of legislative hearing 
began in New York on railroads with an explicit focus on Standard Oil’s rebate system. These 
events culminated in the first major public revelation and recognition of the extent of and 
influence of Standard Oil’s operations and its use of rebates and drawbacks. A Pennsylvania 
grand jury indicted Rockefeller, Flagler, and other associates for conspiracy to create a 
monopoly and injure competitors.199  
Standard Oil was soon thrown into the public’s eye and the first major leveled against 
Standard Oil was articulated by Henry Demarest Lloyd in his article “The Story of a Great 
Monopoly” in the Atlantic Monthly in 1881.  
Lloyd summarized his opinions by stating how: 
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“The Standard holds it vantage-ground, and America has the proud satisfaction of having 
furnished the world with the greatest, wisest, and meanest monopoly known to history. 
To-day, in every part of the United States, people who burn kerosene are paying the 
Standard Oil Company a tax on every gallon amounting to several times its original cost 
to that concern.”200 
 
Although public discontent began to brew over the perceived excesses of Standard Oil’s 
business operations and transportation agreements, a new arrangement was developed. The idea 
was a “trust,” which was focused on ensuring stability in the oil industry. A board of trustees was 
set up, which was given control of the stock of all entities controlled by Standard Oil. Then 
shares were issued in the trust to key individuals, out of the 700,000 total shares, such as 
Rockefeller held 191,700 and Flagler, who held 60,000. The trustees held the shares in the 
individual companies on behalf of the forty-one shareowners of the Standard Oil Trust and were 
in-trusted with the general supervision of the fourteen wholly owned and twenty-six partly 
owned companies. The trustees’ responsibilities included the selection of directors and officers, 
which often included them. The purpose of “the trust” arrangement made it possible that 
establishment of a central office to coordinate and justify the activities of multiple operating 
entities, which became increasingly necessary as the business grew.201  
  The Standard Oil Trust Agreement was signed on January 2, 1882. Simultaneously, 
different Standard Oil organizations were set up in each state to control the entities in those 
states. The entire system was managed by a series of committees and sub-committees below the 
trustees, such as a Domestic Trade Committee, an Export Trade Committee and more. Daily 
reports and updates from the business operations of the trusts flowed into the committees, all of 
whom reported to an Executive Committee, which set the overall policies.202 
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The major business strategy of 1880’s for Standard Oil was a policy of low cost 
producing to maintain a competitive advantage over other oil refiners. Standard Oil required 
efficiency in its operations, control of costs, constant focus on developing technology and 
exploration of new markets. Furthermore, consolidation became a new avenue for cost cutting by 
the middle 1880s, as Standard refineries, in Cleveland, Philadelphia and Bayonne, New Jersey, 
produce over a quarter of the world’s total output of kerosene. Standard Oil also utilized an 
effective communications system to take advantage of price arbitrage in the Oil Regions, 
Cleveland, New York, and Philadelphia and in Europe. The trust effectively utilized an extensive 
system of corporate intelligence and espionage to track markets condition and competitor’s 
activities and output. The focus on scientific research became a major component to the 
development of Standard Oil throughout the 1880’s and 1890’s. Standard Oil renewed focus on 
the quality of the refined oil and on growing its marketing system. Rockefeller insisted on 
consistency and quality control to prevent impure oils, which were notorious for explosions.203  
The new headquarters of the trust soon shifted to a building in lower Manhattan. The 
eventual legal case against Standard in Standard Oil of NJ v US claimed that the firm was a 
monopoly and established a network of collusion among 100 to 200 different sellers.204 The 
government claimed that “unquestionably the principal means used by the defendants to 
monopolize and restrain trade and commerce in petroleum has been the combination of 
previously independent concerns.”205 The official estimate claimed that Standard  acquired 123 
refineries, 11 lubricating oil works, 24 pipeline concerns, and 64 exclusively marketing 
concerns; a total number of 223. 
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Rockefeller acquired a majority of petroleum refining centers in the United States 
through horizontal integration. Rockefeller’s goals for the developing energy market were 
targeted at controlling access points or gauges in the system that all businesses need to go 
through. By controlling the refining process, Rockefeller could exert significant pressure on oil 
and petroleum prices and manipulate them in his favor.  His targeted approach became an 
innovation of sorts for general business strategy.  
In late 1871 Standard began acquiring other Cleveland refineries and in a little more than 
3 months owned virtually all the refineries in Cleveland, or approximately one-quarter of U.S. 
refining capacity.206 Standard then began making refinery acquisitions in other cities and by 1879 
controlled more than 90 percent of U.S. refining capacity. For the following 20 years, Standard 
maintained a dominant share of refining, in spite of the fact that entry into refining remained 
easy.207 
Transportation Advantage 
In contrast to the situation in refining, where there were numerous firms and entry was 
easy, only three railroads transported petroleum in 1870, and new entry was difficult. Therefore, 
in principle it was possible to establish a cartel in petroleum transportation. Standard established 
such a transportation cartel by collusively agreeing to stabilize individual railroad market shares 
and by shifting its petroleum shipments between railroads to enforce the agreement. Since 
effective enforcement of the collusive transportation agreement required standard to possess a 
large share of refining, the railroads facilitated Standard's refinery acquisitions and prevented 
new refiner entry by setting disadvantageously high rates to non-standard refiners. However, the 
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refining profit earned by Standard was only the way in which Standard received its portion of the 
petroleum transportation cartel profits.208 
Klein & Grantitz analysis is “similar to Ida Tarbell's 1904 critique of Rockefeller and 
Standard Oil, which emphasized that "Mr. Rockefeller's great purpose had been made possible 
by his remarkable manipulation of the railroads." However, Tarbell and others who emphasized 
the role of the railroads in Standard's success do not present a consistent economic explanation of 
how the railroads were "manipulated" by Rockefeller, even in the early 1870s before Standard 
achieved its dominant position in refining.' We make economic sense of Tarbell and other 
commentators by demonstrating that Rockefeller, rather than "manipulating" the railroads, 
Cooperated with the railroads in establishing a transportation cartel and, in return for his cartel-
policing efforts, shared in the monopoly profits. Our analysis, therefore, elucidates how a vertical 
relationship can facilitate the creation of monopoly power. 
Rockefeller’s Philosophy on Business and Government  
Ron Chernow elaborates on this idea of Rockefeller’s approach to business by stating 
how “as a self-made man in a new industry, Rockefeller wasn’t stultified by precedent or 
tradition, which made it easier for him to innovate.”209 Concerning Rockefeller’s innovate 
manner; one story best highlights this idea:   
“At first, he paid small coopers up to $2.50 for white barrels before he showed, in an 
demonstration of economies of scale, that he could manufacture dry, tight casks more 
cheaply himself; soon his firm made thousands of blue-painted barrels daily for less than 
a dollar per barrel. Other Cleveland coopers bought and shipped green timber to their 
shops, whereas Rockefeller had the oak sawed in the woods then dried in kilns, reducing 
its weight and slicing transportation costs in half.”210  
 
Fundamental to operations and the strategic decisions of Standard Oil was the underlying 
business philosophy of John D Rockefeller. The very details of Rockefeller’s beliefs on the 
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nature of business, profits and how to operate his firm are especially detailed in Ida Tarbell’s 
account of his life.  
“As time went on, these characteristics became more conspicuous … He gave himself to 
this venture, body and soul one may truthfully say, working with a persistency which put 
day laborers to shame. He watched details with a hawk's eye — not a cent must go astray 
— not a pint of oil be lost — not a rivet or bung be wasted. "Pay a profit to nobody," he 
began to say… A sort of mania for saving seemed to possess him.”211 
 
John D. Rockefeller pursued his business with great passion and ferocity. However, this 
intensity would fuel his most dubious activities and business practices. Perhaps the most famous 
of all of the monopolizing techniques that Standard is supposed to have used is local price 
cutting. Given the bad repute in which monopoly has long been officially held in this country, 
and the prominence of predatory pricing in Standard Oil, it is not surprising that the practice 
received special attention in the law. According to most accounts, the Standard Oil Co. of New 
Jersey established an oil refining monopoly in the United States, in large part through the 
systematic use of predatory price discrimination. Standard struck down its competitors, in one 
market at a time, until  it  enjoyed  a  monopoly position everywhere. Similarly, it preserved its 
monopoly by cutting prices selectively wherever competitors dared enter. Price discrimination, 
so the story goes, was both the technique by which it obtained its dominance and the device with 
which it maintained it.212 
However, some scholars argued that a simpler technique did exist, and Standard used it. 
Unless there are legal restraints, anyone can monopolize an industry through mergers and 
acquisitions, paying for the acquisitions by permitting participation of the former owners in the 
expected monopoly gains. Since profits are thus expanded, all of the participants can be better 
off even after paying an innovator's share to the enterpriser who got the idea in the first place. 
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Under either competition or monopoly, the value of a firm is the present worth of its future 
income stream. Competitive firms can be purchased for competitive asset values or, at worst, for 
only a little more. Even in the case of important recalcitrants, anything up to  the  present value  
of  the  future monopoly profits from the  property will  be  a  worthwhile exchange to  the buyer, 
and a bountiful windfall to the seller. It is conceivable that Standard did not merge to the full size 
it wanted, but did achieve whatever size was necessary to use predatory techniques to grow the 
rest of the way.213 
Rockefeller’s beliefs on competition displayed a cold remorse for those he dominated 
over as his firm grew. Ida Tarbell claimed that Rockefeller’s competiveness pushed him into the 
increasingly blurry lines between unethical and illegal.  She points out Standard Oil’s abuse of 
the transportation arrangements that it had developed through its exclusive rebate deals.214Ida 
Tarbell claimed that secrecy was key element in the business operation of Standard Oil. She 
asserted that   
“nobody in the Standard Oil Company was allowed to know any more than was 
necessary for him to know to do his business. Men who have been officers in the 
Standard Oil Company say that they have been told, when asking for information about 
the condition of the business, ‘You'd better not know. If you know nothing you can tell 
nothing.’”215 
 
Tarbell claimed that the primary reason for this secrecy was “as the business developed 
and its practices became more hostile to public good, one of its chief aims was to protect itself 
from publicity.”216 Tarbell stated that John D. Rockefeller believed that secrecy was essential to 
carrying out his purpose and carrying out his purpose was vastly more important in his opinion 
than telling the truth. Tarbell claimed that Rockefeller held that “Business is the higher law; 
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success in it justifies itself!”217 Rockefeller believed that the proper role of government in the 
economy was a promoter, but not as an extensive regulator. Frequently, Rockefeller put himself 
at odds with the limited regulators that he had to interact with all levels of government because 
of his strong laissez-faire beliefs. Rockefeller acted on this philosophy through evasive business 
tactics, such as the shifting locations of business operations, stock trusts and secret agreements 
on transportation costs. 
Government Policy on Oil 
In the 1880’s, the State legislatures of Ohio and Pennsylvania introduced clauses into 
their constitution forbidding the infamous rebates that Standard Oil had manipulated to its 
advantage.218In 1890, Sherman Anti-Trust Act was passed as US government began to expand its 
control over the US economy. The primary reason for the passage of the act was to combat 
anticompetitive practices, reduce market domination by individual corporations and preserve 
unfettered competition as the rule of trade. The Sherman Antitrust Act formed the foundation 
and the basis for the developing federal antitrust litigation. The individual states began to adopt 
similar antitrust laws to prevent anticompetitive behavior within local intrastate commerce. 
States had to enact laws because the authority of the federal government was limited to interstate 
commerce and not intrastate commerce with the boundaries detailed in United States v. E.C. 
Knight Co.219 
Intervention in the oil market became increasingly more important as US government 
realized the important role of energy in manufacturing and transportation. The effect was an 
increased legal battle between Standard Oil and the Federal Government. The relationship that 
                                                 
217 Ibid, pg 7. 
218 Ibid, pg 6. 
219 “Anti-Trust,” Cornell University Law School: Legal Information Institute, 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antitrust>. 
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existed between the two entities was tense and the perception that the government held of the 
company was negative. Rockefeller’s fears of losing autonomy over his operations were fueling 
the tension and apprehension between his firm and the federal government.  
During the 1870’s and 1880’s, Congress experienced a growing concern over rising 
energy prices. The lack of a stable and healthy relationship between Standard Oil and the Federal 
government allowed for this doubts to fester. The doubts eventually developed into accusations, 
although true, about Standard Oil’s ability to manipulate energy prices and supply. Rockefeller’s 
outspoken beliefs on the role of government and ruthless business tactics merely added to the 
image of Standard Oil as a corrupt monopoly. The eventual court case claimed that  
“that the defendants John D. Rockefeller. William Rockefeller, and Henry M. Flagler. in 
or about the year 1870, and at all times since said time, together with the other individual 
defendants herein, who thereafter from time to time, between said time and 1882, joined 
said conspiracy, to wit, Henry H. Rogers, John D. Archbold, Oliver H. Payne, and 
Charles M. Pratt entered into and have ever since been engaged in a conspiracy with each 
other, and with other persons, corporations, co-partnerships and limited partnerships, as 
hereinafter more particularly stated, to restrain the trade and commerce in petroleum, 
commonly called "crude oil," in refined oil, and in the other products of petroleum, 
among the several States and Territories of the United States and the District of Columbia 
and with foreign nations, and to monopolize the said commerce.”220 
 
The prosecutors claimed that the conspiracy extended over the entire time since about the 
year 1870 up through the time of the trial.  The prosecution claimed that Standard Oil had been 
maintained for the purpose and with the effect of restraining the commerce in the refined oil 
market. The purpose for this restraint was for monopolization of a major portion of the entire 
petroleum industry.221 
                                                 
220 “Transcript of Record: Supreme Court of the United States, Standard Oil Company ET AL. VS. The United 
States.” Supreme Court of the United States. 1910,  pg 6-7. 
221 Ibid, pg 7. 
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Concluding Remarks 
Standard Oil, under the guidance of John D. Rockefeller represents the best example of a 
business very independent of the influences of government on all levels. The firm sought to 
remove itself from the regulations and laws that the federal and state governments tried to place 
on it. The strategy had the consequence of developing not only a negative public image, but an 
antagonistic relationship with the federal government. The oil company was attempting to 
remove itself from public scrutiny and the perceived costs that might occur. However, this 
resulted in a greater cost, a hostile relationship with the federal government. During the second 
industrial revolution, the hostile strategy worked because the federal government had little 
resources or effort to enforce regulations it had set in place. But the growing discontent with the 
excesses of the business community grew over time and result in the populist and progressive 
movements of the late 1890’s and early 20th century. Since the firm did not enjoy a amicable or 
healthy relationship with the federal government, it did not survive monopoly busting period. In 
1911, the firm was dissolved by court order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The period of 1865 through 1895 was marked by major economic growth in the United 
States. The United States transitioned from an agricultural nation into the industrialized 
manufacturing economy. The transition had a profound impact upon the business and 
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governmental interests that controlled the country. Rapidly, small regional businesses bloomed 
into mega corporations with reach over the entire nation and slowly creeping into the 
international market. The government began to take a more proactive role into economic 
activities of the nation and its people by inserting new regulations and establishing corporations 
to face the challenges the country faced. The development of these new companies in 
conjugation with the simultaneous growth in the US federal government formed a unique 
relationship between these two parties. In particular, Union Pacific Corporation, JP Morgan & 
Company and Standard Oil Corporation display the different dimensions of the evolving 
relationship between private enterprise and government.  
 Each of these different firms displayed a different level of autonomy of the US federal 
government and viability of long-term business operations. Union Pacific Corporation displayed 
the company fundamentally intertwined with the federal government. In its inception, it was a 
federally mandated venture that heavily relied on government subsidies to attract investors. 
However, the overreliance on land grants attracted the investors with intentions only for short-
term profits. This focus on the short-turn left the company with any solid leadership throughout 
the second industrial revolution. The result was declining revenues and a weakened position in 
the railroad industry. The relationship with the federal government was unsuccessful and the 
company, in a similar fashion to the general railroad industry, experienced bankruptcy several 
times. The relationship between Union Pacific and the government was one in which the railroad 
company was supported by the government.  
Standard Oil represents is the exact opposite of Union Pacific in terms of its relationship 
with the US government. At its core, the firm was founded with a central figure, John D. 
Rockefeller, who established the firm and guided it’s through the second industrial revolution. 
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Standard Oil succeeded in having a unified and singular leadership, which pushed the firm 
through the late 19th century and led to rising revenues and market dominance. However, the 
failure of the firm came in its hostile relationship with the US federal government. Frequently, 
Standard Oil exploited loop holes of the legal system or blatantly violated federal and state laws. 
The owner expressed incredibly agonistic views on the idea of increased regulation over his firm. 
The result was a tense relationship that kept Standard Oil moving from state to state and its 
eventual dissolution in 1911 at the hands of federal prosecutors.      
 JP Morgan & Co. stands alone as the victorious business by achieving both tenants of the 
successful business. Under the leadership of Junius and then JP Morgan, the firm developed with 
a clear vision and goal for success. The Morgans guided their firms and partnerships, eventually 
all known as JP Morgan & Co., to immense profits and success. In a similar fashion to Standard 
Oil, JP Morgan & Co. was successful in eliminating its competitors and dominating the market 
place. The critical difference between these two firms in their success was their relationship with 
the federal government. Both companies were despised by the public and considered the worst 
excesses of the second industrial revolutions. But, JP Morgan & Co. established itself as vital to 
the operation of the federal government. The firm conveyed the idea to the federal government 
that a large financial firm was necessary to the health of the US economy. Standard Oil on the 
other hand did not convey the idea that a monopoly over the US oil supply was necessary. 
Furthermore, JP Morgan & Company conveyed the image of compliance with laws of the United 
States, whereas Standard Oil was constantly shifting locations to avoid different state laws. 
Although, JP Morgan & Company did not comply with the laws, it attempted the show the image 
of its compliance.222 
                                                 
222 This paper is not advocating these practices or the moral implications of such acts, but merely recognizing how 
effective JP Morgan & Company was at using these practices.  
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 The successful company followed a similar route as JP Morgan & Co. It maintained a 
healthy, but not necessarily amicable relationship with the federal government. A healthy 
relationship meant not being independent of the regulations government or at least appearing to 
be in compliance with these laws. However at the same time, a healthy relationship meant having 
operational independence of the government, both in the short-run and long-run. In this context, 
JP Morgan & Company succeeded where Union Pacific failed. JP Morgan and Company 
maintained a focus on not only short-run profits, but viability in the long-run.  
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